



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE: FUTURE POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSERVATIVES IN
SOUTH KOREA**

by

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December 2016

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
<p>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.</p>			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2016	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE: FUTURE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSERVATIVES IN SOUTH KOREA		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) David J. Yu			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number <u>N/A</u> .			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT <p>This thesis poses three questions: What is one-party dominance? What factors have been identified as encouraging the development of dominant parties in genuinely democratic systems? Do these characteristics apply to the conservative party in South Korea? This thesis focuses on pork barrel politics, fragmentation of opposition parties, and partisan control of the media as possible factors encouraging one-party dominance. To what extent are these structural advantages that the conservatives might hold in government and society, and could these lead to dominance by the conservative party? The thesis finds that the conservatives and progressives both take part in pork barrel politics and both influence the media; the progressive party is more fragmented than the conservatives and this gives the conservatives an advantage, but only a weak one.</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS one-party dominance, Korean politics, Korean government			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 93
16. PRICE CODE			
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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CONSERVATIVES IN SOUTH KOREA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC)**

from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

This thesis poses three questions: What is one-party dominance? What factors have been identified as encouraging the development of dominant parties in genuinely democratic systems? Do these characteristics apply to the conservative party in South Korea? This thesis focuses on pork barrel politics, fragmentation of opposition parties, and partisan control of the media as possible factors encouraging one-party dominance. To what extent are these structural advantages that the conservatives might hold in government and society, and could these lead to dominance by the conservative party? The thesis finds that the conservatives and progressives both take part in pork barrel politics and both influence the media; the progressive party is more fragmented than the conservatives and this gives the conservatives an advantage, but only a weak one.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ANSP	Agency for National Security Planning
CGP	Clean Government Party
DJP	Democratic Justice Party
DLP	Democratic Labor Party
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
FBC	Foundation for Broadcast Culture
GDP	gross domestic product
GG	Green Growth
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
KBS	Korean Broadcasting System
KCC	Korean Communications Commission
KCPT	Pan-South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Expansion in Pyeongtaek
KOBACO	Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MBC	Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation
NDRP	New Democratic Republican Party
NKDP	New Korea Democratic Party
NKP	New Korea Party
NPP	New People Party
NPAD	New Politics Alliance for Democracy
RDP	Reunification Democratic Party
ROK	Republic of Korea
UPP	United Progressive Party
YTN	Yonhap Television News Station

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis will examine the prospects for one-party dominance in South Korea. Specifically, is South Korea's conservative party (which has taken different names at different times) likely to become a dominant party and create a one-party dominant system somewhat like Japan's, or are South Korea's progressives in a position to force alternation in power? The thesis will pursue the following main questions:

- What is the definition of one-party dominance?
- What factors encourage the development of dominant parties in genuinely democratic systems?
- Do these characteristics apply to the conservative party in South Korea?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Since South Korea began holding direct free elections in 1987, two well-institutionalized political parties have emerged: the conservative Saenuri Party and the progressive New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) (these are the parties' current names; they have used different names in the past).¹ The conservative party is the descendant of the authoritarian regime that ruled South Korea from 1948 to 1987. The progressives are the descendants of the opponents of that authoritarian regime. While the conservative party was able to maintain power after democratization, it was only able to hold onto the powerful South Korea presidency for ten years. In 1997, there was a shift in power to the progressive presidency. Then from 2007 until the present day, the conservatives have again held power.

Despite this recent history, it is unclear if alternation of power (as chiefly defined by control of the presidency) will continue. The conservatives might still become a one-

¹ The actual names of the parties have often changed since 1987. The conservative party was also known as the Democratic Justice Party, Democratic Liberal Party, New Korea Party and the Grand National Party. The progressive party was also known as the Party for Peace and Democracy, Democratic Party, National Congress for New Politics, Millennium Democratic Party, United New Democratic Party and Democratic United Party.

party dominant regime, following the trajectory of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. Immediately after World War II, the LDP's conservative predecessors lost power to a progressive party, but managed to recapture it not long after. By 1955 the current LDP had formed and it has held power ever since, with the exception of short periods from 1993–1994 and 2009–2012. Although the LDP's opponents seemed poised to become a regular challenger to the LDP and alternative in power, this potential has yet to be fully realized. Though the conservatives in South Korea have already ceded the presidency for longer than the LDP has ever ceded the cabinet, they have maintained power through authoritarianism from 1948 to 1987, and by 2017 will have maintained power under democracy for 20 of the last 30 years. As the more established party, the conservatives seem to have inherent advantages over the progressives; however, it is not clear if the system is evolving this way.

The prospect of one-party dominance in South Korea is worth investigating not only because it is an open question, but also because the answer matters. In South Korea, the political party in power strongly influences foreign and security policy outcomes. For example, South Korea's policy toward North Korea, the South's most important foreign and security policy issue, underwent a dramatic change during progressive rule. When the progressives took power in 1998, President Kim Dae-jung implemented the Sunshine Policy, an “open door” policy that sought cooperation without placing restrictions on North Korea for non-compliance.² The conservative side, on the other hand, has taken a more firm stance against North Korea, and has also more consistently supported the maintenance of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. When the conservatives took power during the 2007 elections, the Sunshine Policy was eliminated, and South Korea returned to hardline policies against North Korea.³

One-party dominance has also been thought to impact policy within South Korea; although opinions are split as to whether this has mainly positive or negative effects.⁴

² Hyung-gu Lynn, *Bipolar Orders: The Two Koreas since 1989* (New York: Zed Books, 2007), 53.

³ Scott Snyder, “Lee Myung-bak’s Foreign Policy: A 250-Day Assessment,” Asia Foundation, March 16, 2009, <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SnyderLMBForeignPolicyKJDA.pdf>.

⁴ Dorothy J. Solinger, “Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico,” *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 400, doi: 10.1353/jod.2001.0017.

The advantage of one-party dominance is policy stability; there is little chance that a comprehensive change will occur causing a drastic change in policy (assuming the dominant party itself consistently favors a single policy). Furthermore, while dominant parties might provide more policy stability, they also might hurt democratic responsiveness, encourage corruption and pork barrel politics, and marginalize political opponents.⁵ Once firmly established in power, the dominant party could establish laws that benefit itself, possibly to the extent that it transforms the country into a semi-democracy.⁶ Additionally, with unchecked power, gross amounts of gerrymandering could result, encouraging corruption and blocking the opposition from establishing a political presence.

So far, the conservative party of South Korea has been closely aligned with the policy outlook of the United States. Historically, South Korea's authoritarian regime and successor conservative party have closely aligned the country toward the United States; when the regime changed to the progressive party, this alliance was certainly maintained, but South Korea displayed the greatest degree of anti-Americanism in its history. This suggests that policymakers in the United States might prefer the conservatives to become dominant in South Korea and expect them to better support U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula. Even if U.S. policy preferences are put aside, dominance by the conservatives in South Korea might be expected to preserve the status quo of relations between the two countries. Therefore, understanding the sources that might create a one-party dominant regime could allow United States policymakers not only to measure the strength and weakness of the incumbent party but also to assess the likely future trajectory of South Korea foreign policy and thereby to better equip themselves to manage that alliance.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review is divided into two sections. The first will deal with the definition of one-party dominance: what constitutes dominance? The second will deal

⁵ Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, "The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment," in *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy*, eds. Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins (Melbourne, Australia: Harwood, 2005), 14.

⁶ Ibid.

with the causes of one-party dominance: what is thought to encourage or discourage one-party dominance? This thesis considers one-party dominance in the context of democracy and genuine political competition; dominant parties within authoritarian regimes are mostly ignored.

Pempel defines democracy as featuring “free electoral competition, relatively open information systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of free political association.”⁷ In this context, he finds that scholars provide only vague or narrow definitions of one-party dominance. Sartori, for example, simply holds that one-party dominance indicates a dominant party’s being stronger than its competitors.⁸ McDonald, in the context of Latin America, defines a dominant party (or coalition) as one able to obtain a minimum of 60% of legislative seats.⁹ Although he notes the lack of a clear definition, he concedes that it is impossible to establish a universal definition to describe one-party dominance.

Pempel instead establishes four dimensions that are prevalent among one-party dominant systems: parties that satisfy all of these features are considered dominant. In practice, though, two of Pempel’s criteria seem more fundamental than his other two: dominance in number and dominance chronologically.

A party dominant in number is one that wins a preponderance of important political offices. In practice, this usually indicates seats in the national legislature.¹⁰ According to Pempel, what constitutes this preponderance depends on the number of parties. If a country has only two parties, then holding at least 50% of legislative seats would satisfy the definition of dominance. But in the many countries with a multiparty system, less than 50% of seats in government might still be formidable.¹¹ Therefore, in a multi-party system, Pempel sets the standard at 35% (though he recognizes that this is

⁷ T. J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 1.

⁸ Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), 193.

⁹ Ronald H. McDonald, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America* (Chicago: Markham, 1971), 220.

¹⁰ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 336.

¹¹ Ibid.

arbitrarily precise).¹² This standard assumes that opposition parties are too fragmented, ideologically or otherwise, to form a coalition against the dominant party.¹³ If anything, as Horowitz argues, such a dominant party is often able to form alliances with minor parties to benefit mutually in elections.¹⁴ This implies that a dominant party must be the largest single party and control government either alone or in a coalition with weaker partners. Parties that are the single biggest party but that lose to another multi-party coalition do not qualify.

While Pempel focuses on legislatures, his definition of “dominance in number” suggests that a dominant party must also win the presidency, if one exists in the country in question. This must be stipulated because it is possible for a party dominant within the legislature *not* to hold the presidency, in which case it likely fails to be dominant in the political system at large.

Pempel’s second criterion is that a dominant party must be dominant chronologically: the party has to hold power for a long time.¹⁵ While scholars often discuss this general concept, they rarely define it concretely. Pempel only attempts to define chronological dominance by setting a minimum requirement of more than a few years.¹⁶ In most cases, scholars define chronological dominance by reference to particular parties rather than a general standard. Parties commonly considered chronologically dominant include Japan’s LDP (in power for the 38 years from 1955 to 1993 and then for 19 of the 23 years since then), South Africa’s African National Congress (in power from 1994 to the present—21 years and counting) and Sweden’s Social Democratic Party (in power from 1932 to 1976, or 44 years). Further research may eventually lead to a standard minimum definition of chronological dominance.

Dominance in number and chronologically are usually prior conditions for Pempel’s other two criteria: a dominant bargaining position and dominance

¹² Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 336.

¹³ Ibid., 3–4.

¹⁴ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), 328.

¹⁵ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 3–4.

¹⁶ Ibid.

governmentally (i.e., the execution of historical projects and setting of a durable national policy agenda).¹⁷ These aspects of dominance are analytically separate from—but usually follow directly from—dominance in number and over time. Furthermore, a party that enjoys plurality legislative strength will only fail to have a dominant bargaining position if it meets the following conditions. It holds a plurality but not a majority and it faces a larger, multi-party coalition that is not considered dominant in number in the first place. In a presidential system like South Korea’s, a party that establishes dominance in number by winning the presidency will normally enjoy dominant bargaining power against all but the strongest legislative supermajorities (though South Korea’s system gives bargaining power even to minority parties, as outlined in the following discussion). Similarly, parties that enjoy both dominance in number and dominance over time are usually at least in a *position* to establish dominance governmentally and set the national agenda. If such a party fails to set the national agenda, one might classify it as a dominant party that squandered its potential rather than one that was not dominant at all. In this sense, dominance in number and chronologically seem sufficient as twin criteria of dominance.

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party can be seen as an example of a party that satisfies all four of Pempel’s criteria. As noted previously, between 1958 and the present it has governed for all but four years, usually amassing single-party majorities in the national legislature and often either large single-party or coalition majorities. When the LDP was the dominant party, it was able to hold a minimum of 44% of parliament seats.¹⁸ Their next strongest opponents only managed a maximum of 36% of parliament seats.¹⁹ Based on their dominance in number and over time in parliament, they were able to set Japan’s policy agenda in economics, security, and foreign policy.²⁰

The second portion of the thesis will focus on the causes of one-party dominance. Scholars have pointed to a number of factors.

¹⁷ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 4.

¹⁸ “Japan: Parliamentary Elections Shugiin, 1993,” Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 1993, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2161_93.htm.

¹⁹ Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann, eds., *Elections in Asia: A Data Handbook*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), 381.

²⁰ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 24–29.

One possible cause of single-party dominance is historical circumstances; a party may be so closely identified with the country's national identity that it essentially "owns" a reputation as the "natural" party of government. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, by virtue of its leadership in eliminating apartheid and official discrimination and establishing universal suffrage, is sometimes viewed as synonymous with the modern democratic South African state. During the 1994 elections, the party was able to secure more than 60% of the vote, giving it a majority in the National Assembly.²¹

Dominant parties also gain their status through flexibility in policy. Parties that become dominant often prove willing and able to steal good opposition ideas, as opposed to remaining rigid ideologically. Before Japan's LDP had clearly established dominance, the party looked fated to lose to their opponents eventually; however, the party flexibly turned its attention away from the security treaty issues that drew massive protests and instead shifted focus to the economy through a double-the-income policy that ushered in the "economic miracle" of the 1960s. The party later transformed itself from a growth-only party into a party that also dealt with the undesirable by-products of that growth, such as environmental damage and a perception of insufficient emphasis on consumer (as opposed to business and producer) interests and social welfare.²² When the LDP was created in 1955, the party subsidized rural farmers and business owners. When these expenditures exceeded tax revenues, the LDP's ability to adapt to this changing environment kept the party popular with the public. During the 1970s, citizen movements were on the rise, demanding "increased government spending to improve social welfare programs and to address problems of pollution."²³ The LDP recognized these demands and quickly acted to meet them. Under the guidance of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, under a slow economy, the LDP pursued positive-sum politics by implementing Keynesian economic policy to stimulate the economy and government revenue.²⁴ The

²¹ Giliomee and Simkins, "Dominant Party Regimes," 15.

²² Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1988), 53.

²³ Ibid., 47.

²⁴ Curtis, *Japanese Way of Politics*, 47.

LDP's flexibility (aided by the expanding revenues that it had a hand in producing) ultimately allowed it to identify itself with both economic growth and many potential critics of growth.

Dominant parties are also able to use clientelism to their advantage. The breadth of public funds available to incumbents helps them entrench themselves. Japan's LDP took advantage of this system by appealing to voters through clientelism. As the incumbents, the LDP was able to use government funds to "reward its supporters, to cultivate new support, and to reorder the government's policy priorities."²⁵

Dominant parties are also able to take advantage of the fragmentation of the opposition. This may reflect opposition parties' ideological and/or organizational rigidity and incompatibility. In Japan, in contrast to the LDP with its ability and willingness to adapt to changing environments, the LDP's opponents long put ideology above votes. LDP candidates running for a district may have disagreed on party policy; however, once elected, the LDP as an organization put party agenda above personal ideology. The LDP's longtime socialist opposition, though, was not particularly pragmatic as an organization.²⁶ When opportunity appeared for the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to move to the political center, the left-leaning core of the party prevented the party from doing so.²⁷ Internal strife within the JSP would see party members breaking away to form different parties. The formation of these parties only assisted the LDP staying in power. During the mid-1970s, there were five main opposition parties in Japan.²⁸ While they were able to steal votes and Diet seats from the LDP, these parties were unable to develop into major parties and assisted the LDP by fragmenting votes among themselves.²⁹ None of the minor, non-JSP opposition parties regularly received more than 10% of the vote in national elections.³⁰

²⁵ Ibid., 46.

²⁶ Ibid., 16.

²⁷ Ibid., 18.

²⁸ Ibid., 20.

²⁹ Ibid., 21.

³⁰ Curtis, *Japanese Way of Politics*, 21.

Electoral systems can also contribute to one-party dominance. Before 1996, Japan operated under a single non-transferable vote system with multi-member districts, which encouraged multiple members of the same large party to run in the same district, but also encouraged multiple small parties to run against each other rather than unite behind a single standard-bearer.³¹ This entrenched the LDP in government by encouraging them to appeal to voters using clientelism, while discouraging small opposition parties from working together or causing larger opposition parties to split into smaller ones in the first place.³²

A party might also entrench itself in power based on the support of the international community, including the United States. During the Cold War, the United States saw Japan—and the LDP in particular—as a valuable ally to fight communism in the area. The United States encouraged both the transformation of the Japanese economic system and the development of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Presently, the United States and Japan’s conservative party maintains a strong economic and foreign policy partnership.

D. STATE OF AND POTENTIAL FOR ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE IN SOUTH KOREA

1. Dominance in Number, Bargaining Position, Chronology?

After democratization, the South Korean presidency was held by conservatives for ten years (1988–1998), followed by the progressives for ten years (1998–2008), and again by the conservatives for another ten years (2008–2018). Each ten-year period included two successive five-year presidential terms (Korean presidents are limited to a single term). The presidency not only has alternated between parties but also has usually been won by only modest margins. In the 1987 elections, conservative Roh Tae-woo won the presidency with 36.6% of the popular vote, a difference of only 8.6% over his closest rival.³³ In 1992, conservative Kim Young-sam received 42% of the popular vote, again

³¹ Ibid., 10.

³² Ibid., 214.

³³ Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, *Elections in Asia*, 420.

only 8.2% from his closest opponent.³⁴ When progressive Kim Dae-jung won in 1997, he captured 40.3% of the votes; a difference of 1.6% from his conservative rival.³⁵ When the progressives were returned to office in 2002, Roh Moo-hyun was able to capture 48.91% of the votes; a difference of 2.32% from his conservative rival.³⁶ When the conservatives recaptured the presidency in 2007, President Lee Myung-bak won in a rare landslide with only 48.7% of the votes, but 22.6% more than his progressive rival.³⁷ Five years later, when President Park Geun-hye was elected in 2012, she was able to obtain 51.6% of the votes, but defeated her progressive opponent by 3.6%.³⁸

In the national legislature, with the exception of 2004, the conservatives won more seats than their competitors, but not always the majority of seats. The Korean legislature has 299 seats, requiring a party to hold 150 seats to win the majority. During the presidency of Roh Tae-woo from 1988–1993, there were two legislative elections. In the legislative elections of 1988, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) (Conservative) was able to obtain 125 seats; however, they were unable to craft a durable majority coalition to support President Roh.³⁹ For four years of President Roh's presidency, he did not have control over the legislature. During the 1992 elections, the Democratic Liberal Party (Conservative) was able to obtain 149 seats, one shy of a majority.⁴⁰ However, the DLP was able to form a coalition with ten independents, giving them a majority with 159 seats. During the presidency of Kim Young-sam from 1993 to 1998, two legislative elections were held. In the 1996 legislative elections, the New Korea Party (Conservative) was able to obtain 139 seats.⁴¹ While they did not have a majority, they

³⁴ Uk Heo and Terrence Roehrig, *South Korea since 1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 44.

³⁵ Ibid., 39.

³⁶ “Elections: South Korea Presidential Dec. 19, 2002,” ElectionGuide, 2015, <http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1879/>.

³⁷ “Elections: South Korea Pres Dec. 19, 2007,” ElectionGuide, 2015, <http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2057/>.

³⁸ “Elections: South Korea Presidential Dec. 2012,” ElectionGuide, 2015, <http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2255/>.

³⁹ Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, *Elections in Asia*, 420.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, *Elections in Asia*, 420.

were able to form majority coalitions. This effectively gave Kim a friendly legislature for his entire presidency. When Progressives took the presidency in 1998, they did not enjoy a legislative majority and this situation continued after the 2000 legislative elections, when the Grand National Party (Conservative) was able to win 133 seats (in a legislature temporarily reduced to 273 seats from the usual 299), compared to the Millennium Democratic Party's (Progressive) 115 seats.⁴² In the 2004 elections, the Uri party (Progressive) won 152 seats of 299 seats to achieve a majority, while the conservative Grand National Party was only able to obtain 121 seats.⁴³ This marked the first time the progressives controlled the legislature outright. When the conservatives returned to the presidency, they were able to obtain a majority outright without coalition partners. In the 2008 legislative elections, the Saenuri (Conservative) party was able to obtain 153 seats, and in the 2012 legislature elections, it obtained 152 seats.⁴⁴

Since 1988, the conservatives have controlled the legislature for 16 years, eight by winning a majority outright and eight through coalitions with minor parties. The progressives have only won a majority outright for four years. For eight years, neither party was able to capture a majority, even through leadership of a coalition.

Overall, while the conservative party in South Korea has sometimes been dominant in number and bargaining position, it is hard to describe them as dominant chronologically. While they have held legislative majorities more often than their opponents, this has not been on a consistent basis.

2. Dominance Governmentally?

From 1948 until democratic elections were held in 1987, the conservatives were in power in the form of an authoritarian regime. This allowed conservatives to shape the country's economic policy. During the authoritarian presidency of Park Chung-hee from 1961 to 1979, the state developed a close relationship with conglomerates (*chaebols*),

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "Republic of Korea: Elections in 2004," IPU, 2007, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2259_04.htm.

⁴⁴ "Republic of Korea (Kuk Hoe) Elections in 2008," IPU, 2012, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2259_08.htm.

deliberately developing them as economic pillars of Korean society. President Park was able to monopolize power and enforce enduring economic policies that were necessary for South Korea to grow; he legitimized his rule with results, increasing gross domestic product (GDP) yearly from 1963 to 1979.⁴⁵

Even when the progressives took power in 1997, there was a limit to how much change they could make under the current economic system. The progressives did achieve substantial reforms that undercut the strong state-business relationship; they started to open the market for small business and allowed small amounts of foreign investors into the country as competition.⁴⁶ Furthermore, they prevented conglomerates from remaining family-led enterprises. *Chaebols* had been family-run companies that were passed from generation to the next, with corporate boards dominated by family members. Under President Kim Dae-jung, chaebols were newly required to hire 50% of board members from outside the company.⁴⁷ But while the progressives made such efforts to limit the power of the chaebols, the Korean government still relies heavily on chaebols for economic success.

When conservative President Lee Myung-bak was elected in 2007, one reason he won was the past economic performance of the conservative party; the conservatives still enjoy the legacy of past economic performance. Based upon this data, the conservative party in South Korea should be dominant governmentally; however, this depends on the demands of civil society. If and when the most important issue is the economy, the conservatives have an advantage, but if and when voters' concerns shift to civil rights and democratic processes, the conservative party may have a disadvantage, as they are linked to the authoritarian regime.

⁴⁵ Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government–Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," in *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, ed. Frederic C. Deyo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 1311.

⁴⁶ Andrew Macintyre, T. J. Pempel, and John Ravenhill, *Crisis as Catalyst: Asia's Dynamic Political Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2008), 79.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 81.

3. Potential Factors Encouraging One-Party Dominance in South Korea

When analyzing the causes of one-party dominance, there are a plethora of potential factors. While this thesis will not go into an in-depth discussion of these potential factors, this section presents factors that may cause one-party dominance in South Korea.

Unlike the LDP in Japan, pragmatism and opposition dogmatism does not seem to favor one party exclusively in South Korea; factors that caused conservatives to win elections have varied. During the 2007 presidential election, the opposition managed to undermine its own pragmatism. Lee Myung-bak (Conservative) defeated Chung Dong-young (Progressive) by 48.7% of the vote to 26.1%.⁴⁸ One of the reasons for the progressive defeat was the failure of ex-President Roh Moo-hyun to uphold his anti-corruption stance while in office. Since authoritarian rule, there has always existed a close relationship between the government and big businesses (*chaebol*); this often leads to corruption of government officials. Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, championed the same approach to rid the government of crony capitalism; however, he ended up violating his own policy by using Hyundai Asan as an intermediary to send cash to North Korea. Similarly, during President Roh Moo-hyun's tenure in office, instead of ridding corruption, Roh became entangled in a bribery scandal; he was also the first democratically elected president to be impeached.

During 2012 Presidential elections, though, dogmatism did lead the progressives to lose. Moon Jae-in (NPAD—Progressive) formed an alliance with ultra-progressive candidate Lee Jung-hee (United Progressive Party [UPP]) to rally against Park Guen-hye (Saenuri—Conservative Party); however, the UPP only managed to marginalize the New Politics Alliance for Democracy. During a televised debate, the UPP attacked the Saenuri candidate stating that by voting for the conservatives it would be a return to the Yushin constitution (authoritarian rule under President Park Chung-hee); the attacks by UPP

⁴⁸ “Elections: South Korea Pres Dec. 19, 2007,” ElectionGuide.

undermined the NPAD campaign.⁴⁹ The NAPD could not use the same attacks against Saenuri; the UPP having a reputation for being a far-left/pro-North, the NAPD could not risk using the same attacks and being labeled with the same ideologies as the UPP.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the far-left dogmatism of the UPP marginalized the NPAD.

Furthermore, the conservative party seems to be semi-flexible when it comes to policy flexibility. When President Lee Myung-bak attempted to pass his Green Growth (GG) policy in 2008, he needed the support of the *chaebols*. Initially, Heo explains that, “large firms, including POSCO, Samsung, and LG, presented strategies supporting the Green Growth Policy.”⁵¹ However, when the framework of the GG policy was introduced, *chaebols* started to withdraw their support. The *chaebols* contended that the Emission Trading Scheme would increase operations costs and cut into the company’s bottom line.⁵² As Heo explains, the government failed to “provide adequate financial and tax incentives to induce investments of market capital in green industries.”⁵³ Ultimately, the government suspended the GG program, and relaxed regulations to meet the demands of the *chaebols*.

While they were flexible when it came to the *chaebols*, the conservatives were not as flexible to the demands of civil society. The biggest complaint from the civil society opposition was the conservative’s unilateral approach in pushing the GG program. Therefore, because of this confrontation with civil society, it further provoked disagreements between the two sides. Furthermore, civil society aligned itself with the opposition which further complicated its ability to pass the policy.

Similarly like Japan, South Korea has the support of the international community; it has a powerful ally in the United States; however, this alliance will not drastically

⁴⁹ Ji-yoon Kim and Karl Friedhoff, “Right, Wrong, and Ahead: Why Moon Lost, Park, Won, and the Road Forward,” *Asan Institute for Policy Studies*, December 23, 2012, <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-40-right-wrong-and-ahead-why-moon-lost-park-won-and-the-road-forward/>.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Inhye Heo, “The Political Economy of Policy Gridlock in South Korea: The Case of the Lee Myung-bak Government’s Green Growth Policy,” *Politics and Policy* 41, no. 4 (August 2013): 521, doi: 10.1111/polp.12029.

⁵² Ibid., 522.

⁵³ Ibid.

change depending upon who is in power. They both try to maintain good relationships with the U.S. While U.S. military base conflicts are at a minimum with conservatives in power, when progressives hold the majority in legislature and the presidential office, the situation becomes complicated.

Unlike the conservatives, the progressive party holds a closer relationship with civil society groups. Members of the progressive party were individuals that fought the authoritarian party and were once members of civil society groups. Even though the progressives hold a close relationship with civil society groups, national security will take precedence over ideology. This was demonstrated during the anti-base movement involving the movement of the military base in Yong-san to Pyeongtaek. The Pan-South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Expansion in Pyeongtaek (KCPT) gained traction with some members of the progressive party who protested against the base relocation. The KCPT argued that “the entire base relocation process was conducted without the input of Daechuri residents, who were now being forcefully evicted.”⁵⁴ Their concerns were represented in government by the Uri (ruling progressive party) and the Democratic Labor Party (DLP); however, they were a minority within the progressive party. As Yeo explains, “the handful of National Assembly members sympathetic to the KCPTs cause had very little power to persuade their fellow representatives on the Pyeongtaek issue.”⁵⁵ President Roh Moo-hyun was in a dilemma in dealing with the anti-base movement. He wanted to keep positive relations with the United States; however, he also did not want to suppress the KCPTs movement.⁵⁶ In the end, the security of the country took precedence over ideology. As Yeo explains, “President Roh...recognized the potential for further deterioration in the alliance if the Korean government failed to fulfill its end of the bargain on base relocation.”⁵⁷ The progressives accomplished this by turning their backs against the KCPT. The Ministry of National Defense labeled the

⁵⁴ Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011), 138.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 140.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 146.

KCPT as outside forces who were forcing their own political agenda upon the residents of Daechuri.⁵⁸

While this section presents potential factors that may cause one-party dominance in South Korea, Chapter III of this thesis will give an in-depth analysis of the following factors: they are Pork barrel politics, fragmentation of the opposition, and control of the media. In analyzing the LDP of Japan, these factors can be seen as the most significant factors that enabled the party to establish dominance from 1955 to 1993. While this section will not get into the details of these factors, an in-depth analysis will be given in Chapter III.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is structured into three sections. The first section will examine the definition of one-party dominance. It will take into account the context in which one-party dominance will be examined and define the dimensions of one-party dominance. The second section will focus on what causes one-party dominance in a liberal democratic society by examining historical cases and finding commonalities of one-party dominance. The final section will focus on the conservative party of South Korea and if a one-party dominant system can be achieved by the conservatives.

In defining one-party dominance in South Korea, Pempel describes four areas in which a party needs to hold to become a dominant party: dominance in number, bargaining position, chronology, and governmentally. Some of Pempel's definitions of these four areas cannot be directly applied or there is a need for these definitions to be further clarified. Dominance in South Korea involves holding the presidency and a simple majority in the National Assembly for three consecutive terms. Additionally, a dominant party should hold a dominant position governmentally; however, it is not an absolute requirement to do so.

In examining the causes of one-party dominance in South Korea, a comparative analysis will be done between the conservatives in South Korea and the LDP of Japan.

⁵⁸ Yeo, *Activists, Alliances*, 147.

The LDP has been a dominant party in Japan from 1955 to 1993. During this period, scholars have identified three main factors that have caused the LDP to become a dominant party during this period: a deft use of pork barrel politics, opposition fragmentation that enabled the LDP to dominate government, and a close relationship with the media. When these factors are applied to South Korea, this thesis finds that no party holds an advantage in regard to pork barrel and the media; however, the progressive party is fragmented, which gives a weak advantage to the conservatives. An in-depth analysis of these factors will be provided in Chapter III.

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II. DEFINING ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE—THEORY FOR SOUTH KOREA

In a free democratic government, there is a struggle for power between multiple parties; however, this struggle for power can be generalized as taking place between the incumbents and their political opposition. The objective of the incumbent is to retain power and prevent challengers from dethroning them. The opposition's objective is the inverse of the incumbents—it attempts to displace the incumbents by diverting support to itself. The political positions of each of these two entities are dependent upon their current standing. Incumbents, by virtue of their position, have an advantage over the opposition; they will remain in power unless they are removed from their position by the opposition. The challengers, by contrast, have the burden of reversing the advantages held by the incumbents in order to redirect votes to themselves that would have gone to the incumbents. The effort required is dependent upon incumbents' strength. Ultimately, the political party that gains a majority of the votes takes control of the government.

Since incumbents, by virtue of their position, have a structural advantage over the opposition, an inequality exists between the two parties; however, successful opposition parties mature and evolve with time. When this occurs, the opposition gradually grows in power, indicating that the incumbents are slowly losing their own. This rivalry between the incumbents and opposition often has three phases. In phase one, the incumbents are on the offensive while the opposition party is on the defensive; the opposition party is trying to stop the incumbents from increasing their power over the state even further. If an incumbent party is able to keep the opposition on the defensive for an extended period of time, it may be considered a dominant party. If the opposition is able to mount an offensive against the incumbents, both parties will reach a second phase, in which political conditions do not necessarily favor either party—that is, a competitive political system. At this stage, if the opposition is able to remove the advantages held by the incumbents and win, it forces the third phase: the transfer of power from incumbent to challengers. If the challengers are able to maintain that power for an extended period of time, they would then be considered the dominant party, and the parties' roles would be

reversed; the previous incumbents would become the opposition, and the opposition will become the incumbents.

With regard to one-party dominance, of main interest are the methods through which incumbents are able to keep the political system from moving beyond phase one. During all phases, competition between political parties may be fought in various dimensions, each of which may be considered one aspect of dominance. In his book *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, T.J. Pempel holds that a party may be dominant in four dimensions: in number, in bargaining position, chronologically, and governmentally.⁵⁹ While Pempel states that a party must generally be dominant in all four dimensions to be described as “dominant” overall, this thesis will argue that not all four characteristics are necessary for a party to be considered dominant. If a party is able to meet at a minimum three particular conditions out of these four—dominance in number, in bargaining position, and chronologically—this should enable us to describe a party as dominant. Dominance governmentally is less an absolute requirement for a party to be seen as dominant than it is a likely by-product of dominance in the other three dimensions (and likely only possible in the first place given dominance in the other dimensions).

A. DOMINANCE IN NUMBER

Dominance in number can be interpreted most straightforwardly as majority control of a legislature. In the case of a presidency, this simply implies control of the presidency, since “majority control” would make no sense except in cases of multi-person presidencies. This thesis argues that the presidency should take priority over the legislature in defining dominance, but that both branches must factor into the definition. First, winning the presidency is a more direct reflection of popular support. South Korea uses a simple popular vote to choose the president and so each individual has a direct impact on who is elected. Second, although Pempel argues that dominance in number should be signified by a majority of legislative seats, this argument is dependent upon the

⁵⁹ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 3–4.

assumption that a simple majority allows a political party to dominate the legislature.⁶⁰ In the case of South Korea, a simple majority does not necessarily allow a political party to unilaterally pass bills against minority opposition. In 2012, the National Assembly Advancement Act was amended to limit the majority party from unilaterally passing bills through the National Assembly.⁶¹ A bill that is contested by the opposition can only move forward for vote if three-fifths of the National Assembly agrees to the bill. Furthermore, the National Assembly speaker can only unilaterally push an agenda during a natural disaster or war or via agreement with the opposition parties.⁶² The president does retain veto power, through which he or she can reject bills that are passed by the National Assembly. Therefore, the criteria for dominance depend on whether a party controls the presidency. If a party does control the presidency, it should also have a simple majority of the legislature to be considered dominant. If it does not control the presidency, it can be still considered dominant via control of two-thirds of the National Assembly. The structural logic behind these criteria will be explained in the next section, which discusses dominance in bargaining position.

B. DOMINANT BARGAINING POSITION

While the standard for unilateral legislative power is higher in the case of South Korea, this thesis argues that dominance in number can be achieved in several ways, depending upon whether a party controls the presidency. Furthermore, dominance in number should lead a party to gain a dominant bargaining position. Under the constraints of the National Assembly Advancement Act of 2012, and given, and the veto power held by the president, the possible combinations of dominance in number and bargaining dominance in South Korea are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

⁶⁰ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 4.

⁶¹ Steven Denney, “The Tyranny of the Minority in South Korea,” *Diplomat*, September 20, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-tyranny-of-the-minority-in-south-korea>.

⁶² Ibid.

Table 1. Party Controls the Presidency

		Type of majority in National Assembly			
Incumbent	Two-thirds majority	Three-fifths majority	Simple majority (less than three-fifths)	Does not hold simple majority	
Type of dominance	Complete	Complete	Weak	Weak to no dominance	

Table 2. Opposition Controls the Presidency

		Type of majority in National Assembly			
Incumbent	Two-thirds majority	Three-fifths majority	Simple majority (less than three-fifths)	Does not hold simple majority	
Type of dominance	Strong	No dominance	No dominance	No dominance	

1. Party Holding the Presidency

If a given party controls the presidency, it should at a minimum hold a three-fifths majority in the National Assembly in order to establish complete dominance in both number and bargaining position over the opposition. This would allow the party to unilaterally push bills through the National Assembly and is the scenario that every party strives to achieve.

If the president's party were to only hold a simple majority over the opposition in the legislature, this would constitute a weakly dominant position. In South Korea, a simple majority in the National Assembly still requires a party to bargain with its opposition in order for bills to pass the legislature; it can no longer unilaterally pass bills without obstruction. One advantage that the majority party would still hold over the opposition in this scenario is the power of presidential veto. This would require greater compromise of the opposition, as bills that favor the opposition would most likely be vetoed by the president. This would be considered weak dominance.

Lastly, if the president's party does not hold even a simple majority of the legislature, its degree of dominance would depend upon the opposition's strength in the National Assembly. In this situation, even if the opposition were to control three-fifths of the National Assembly, the president's party would still enjoy weak dominance over the opposition. If the opposition was able to unilaterally push bills through the National Assembly, the president's party would still hold veto power and be able to force a compromise. If the opposition were to hold a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, the president's party would have no dominance; the *non*-presidential party would be considered to be dominant in number and bargaining position. According to the constitution of South Korea, Article 53,

In case there is a request for reconsideration of a bill, the National Assembly reconsiders it, and if the National Assembly repasses the bill in the original form with the attendance of more than one half of the total members, and with a concurrent vote of two-thirds or more of the members present, it becomes law.⁶³

Once a political party holds two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it gains the power to override presidential authority. At a minimum, the president's party should meet the criteria of weak dominance, as defined here, to be considered a dominant party in South Korea.

2. Dominance by a Non-presidential Party

The inverse applies when the opposition holds the presidency. As explained earlier, in this scenario, the only possible way for a non-presidential party to be considered dominant is for it to hold a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in order to override the veto power held by the presidency. Without control of the presidency, anything less than a two-thirds supermajority in the legislature would be considered not dominant.

⁶³ "Constitution of the Republic of Korea," National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2012, http://korea.assembly.go.kr/res/low_01_read.jsp?boardid=1000000035.

3. Summary of Bargaining Power Requirements

In analyzing the following scenarios, in South Korea there is an inherent advantage in holding the presidency; even without a majority in the National Assembly, the veto power of the presidency can force the opposition to compromise.

In addition to this technical advantage, holding the presidency provides a major bargaining position over the opposition. The president has the ability to take unilateral actions granted under the South Korean constitution; he or she can take actions that do not need the approval of the National Assembly. As the chief representative of the country, the president has the ability to unilaterally conduct and agree to foreign treaties, declare war, and bypass the National Assembly in times of emergency. Article 76 of the Korean constitution defines emergency situations as a “time of internal turmoil, external menace, natural calamity, or a grave financial or economic crisis.”⁶⁴ Furthermore, the president can appoint and dismiss public officers at his or her whim; he or she has the ability to appoint individuals to posts in a way that creates an advantage in implementing policies.⁶⁵ The biggest advantage of the presidency is the ability to self-interpret these laws and execute policies as he or she sees fit. Furthermore, Article 84 protects the president from being charged with a crime unless he or she conducts an uprising or commits treason.⁶⁶ This allows the president to take risks that might not be feasible for members of the National Assembly. Unless a two-thirds majority is reached in the National Assembly, the Assembly must consider the risk of a veto by the president. The President, on the other hand, has the ability to interpret law and execute those laws without the approval of the National Assembly. This gives the president an advantage.

C. DOMINANCE CHRONOLOGICALLY

The literature on one-party dominance includes multiple attempts to define dominance in chronology. Close examination of the literature shows that scholars take

⁶⁴ “Constitution of the Republic of Korea,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

varying approaches to this definition. Bogaards summarizes the definitions of chronological dominance provided by scholars, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Summary of Chronological Dominance Defined by Scholars⁶⁷

Author	Coleman	Van de Walle & Butler	Ware (predominant)	Ware (dominant)	Sartori (predominant)	Pempel
Duration	Analysis limited to single election	Analysis limited to single election	Permanent	Dominant party should usually win	Three consecutive elections	Substantial period

All definitions but Sartori's are ambiguous; they do not provide a concrete timeframe over which a party's control of government can be considered to make it a dominant party. Since these definitions are fluid and open to interpretation, this thesis will base chronological dominance on the definition provided by Sartori.

Nwokora and Pelizzo summarize Sartori's definition of chronological dominance: "when, for three successive elections, the potential for power alternation does not translate into actual alternation, a party system can no longer be treated as two-party and must be regarded as predominant."⁶⁸ One problem with Sartori's definition is that he does not specifically explain *why* the minimum requirement should be three consecutive elections; he concentrates instead on the characteristics of parties that have won three consecutive elections. Nwokora and Pelizzo state that these properties are "(1) a unimodal power concentration; and (2) an absence of power alternation."⁶⁹

Sartori states that a party able to win three consecutive elections must be considered a predominant party—and this thesis essentially agrees, arguing that chronological dominance should be used as one indicator of dominance. In examining

⁶⁷ Source: Matthijs Bogaards, "Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa," *European Journal of Political Research* 42, no. 2 (March 2004): 176, 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00150.x.

⁶⁸ Zim Nwokora and Riccardo Pelizzo, "Sartori Reconsidered: Toward a New Predominant Party System," *Political Studies* 62, no. 4 (October 2013): 826, doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12078.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

South Korea, three consecutive elections will be used a benchmark. Additionally, the properties behind chronological dominance as described by Sartori will be used to guide this thesis' examination of whether the conservative party in South Korea seems headed toward chronological dominance.

D. DOMINANCE GOVERNMENTALLY

Pempel states that a governmentally dominant party will venture on a historical project, “a series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give particular shape to the national political agenda.”⁷⁰ A party that is dominant should be able to set an agenda for public policy. Furthermore, in a democracy, parties rely on the votes of public to stay in power. Therefore, the agenda set by the dominant party should also not interfere with its ability to sustain dominance; it should not lead them to lose dominance in government. Additionally, the agenda set by the dominant party should be durable, helping to legitimize the party’s dominance in government and enabling them to stay in power. While Pempel argues that a dominant party must display governmental dominance, this thesis argues that this is not an absolute requirement. In order for a party to achieve governmental dominance, the party must normally meet the prior three dominance criteria: dominance in number, dominance in bargaining position, and dominance chronologically. Furthermore, even if a party were to meet the first three requirements of dominance, it is the party’s choice as to whether to set the national agenda. While failing to do so would be a wasted opportunity, it does not, by definition, significantly impact the structural dominance that such a party would have already achieved.

E. EXAMINING DOMINANCE IN SOUTH KOREA FROM 1988–2015

1. The Importance of the Presidency in South Korea

As noted previously, when examining a party’s ability to exert a dominant bargaining position, the assumption is usually made that with a simple majority in the legislature, a party should be able to effectively pass legislation on its own. The

⁷⁰ Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, 4.

implementation of South Korea's National Assembly Advancement Act in 2012, though, has now empowered the opposition to have an effective voice in the National Assembly. In order for a law to be passed, unless the majority party holds a three-fifths *supermajority* in the National Assembly, a compromise with the opposition is required to pass laws. Since elections became democratic in 1987, no South Korean party has ever held a three-fifths majority. Currently, the conservative party is seeking to revise the National Assembly Advancement Act to eliminate these stringent majority requirements; the South Korean Constitutional Court is holding open hearings in regard to the legitimacy of the Advancement Act.⁷¹ It is unknown how the Constitutional Court will vote or if the two parties will compromise to eliminate these stringent majority requirements; a compromise seems highly unlikely, since the Assembly Act empowers the opposition and provides leverage against the conservatives.

Currently in South Korea, the conservatives hold both the presidency and a simple majority in the National Assembly. While this constitutes a numerical advantage over the progressives, the system allows the smaller progressives to gain a stronger bargaining position. Evidence that supports this claim includes the frequency with which the Korean National Assembly passes bills in a timely manner. After current President Park assumed the presidency on February 25, 2013, the conservatives waited a full year before approved committee bills were brought forth to the plenary session for possible passage. In order for the 131 bills to be passed on February 28, 2014, President Park compromised with the opposition and agreed to establish a reform committee providing oversight over the Korean National Intelligence Service.⁷² This was due to the alleged misconduct of the National Intelligence Service for manipulating public opinion in the 2012 South Korean presidential election. Furthermore, the conservatives would need to compromise again on September 30, 2015, in order to pass 90 bills approved by lower committees.⁷³ As part of

⁷¹ Bae Hyun-jung, "Chung Seeks Compromise on Assembly Vote Rules," *Korea Herald*, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://heraldk.com/en/2016/01/28/chung-seeks-compromise-on-assembly-vote-rules/>.

⁷² Son Young-il, "National Assembly Escapes Stagnation...Passes 1 Bill per 91 Seconds," *Naver*, October 1, 2014, <http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&oid=020&aid=0002658699&sid1=001>.

⁷³ Ibid.

this compromise, though, the only major victory the progressives were able to gain was related to the Sewol Bill, which dictated formalities into how an investigation into the Sewol ferry sinking would proceed.

The progressive parties' stalling of legislative bills for close to a year suggests that as a result of the National Assembly Amendment Act of 2012, a party with a simple majority but not a supermajority in the National Assembly indeed cannot pass bills unilaterally. It would be simple, then, to conclude that no party is currently able to control a dominant bargaining position. However, there are disadvantages associated with stalling bills through the Amendment Act; there could be negative consequences for the stalling party. In the case of the progressives, when they swiftly forced the conservatives to compromise and passed legislative bills during February 2014, this was considered a win for the progressives; according to Gallup Korea, during this period progressive popularity rose from 15% to 28%.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the progressives were able to draw independent voters to their party, gaining votes at the potential expense of the conservatives. But the period during which legislative bills were passed from February 2014 through September 2015 also displayed how volatile it could be for the party to stall conservative progress in the National Assembly for an extended period of time. During that period, progressive gains started to recede while the popularity of the conservatives increased. By the end of the year, progressive support dropped to 22%, while the conservatives were able to increase theirs to 41%.⁷⁵

Of course, all bills must also be approved by the president. Therefore, this thesis argues that in South Korea, above all else, holding dominance over the presidency will lead to a dominant bargaining position. Although the National Assembly Advancement Act would require the president to compromise with the opposition to further their political agenda, the president still ultimately controls policymaking; this is important if the same party stays in control for an extended period of time. It can be argued that in any presidential system, the president always has the authority to veto bills that do not fit

⁷⁴ Gallup Korea, "Gallup Korea Daily Opinion: 201st Issue–2016 March 2nd Week," 2015, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKoreaDailyOpinion_151%2820150227%29.pdf.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

his or her overall political objectives. Most of the time, this advantage applies when the *opposition* tries to pass bills unilaterally in the National Assembly. Furthermore, if the same party holds a simple majority in the National Assembly and has control over the presidency, the majority party is more inclined to follow the wishes of the president and this weakens the bargaining position held by the minority. The reason for this expectation of governing party unity is the political clout held by the president over subordinate party members. Unless there is a valid reason provided by law, the president cannot forcefully remove individuals in the opposition party; however, the president does have more free and informal discretion to remove individuals within his or her own party. This gives power to the president to unilaterally push his or her agenda while maintaining political pressure to follow the president or face repercussions.

Evidence of this was displayed in the conservative and progressive compromise on Civil Service Pension reforms on March 2015. Upon President Park's request to reform civil service pensions on March 2015, the conservative party needed to compromise with the progressives to pass legislation; one of those compromises would come at a later date in September 2015, when the conservatives compromised on how to conduct the Sewol ferry investigation with the progressives. At the core of the compromise to pass the civil service pension reform was the insistence of the progressives to make changes to the National Assembly Act governing the administrative abilities of the President; the revision would allow the National Assembly to directly challenge the president on how laws were administered. As unlikely as it would normally be for this type of compromise to be generated by the conservatives in the National Assembly, they knew that some form of compromise would be necessary to pass any law. While the conservatives may have thought that this type of concession was necessary, their shortsightedness about their autonomy vis-à-vis their own president seemed evident from the events that followed. When both parties discussed changes to the National Assembly Act, President Park warned conservative party members that she would veto any bill that would change the National Assembly Act.⁷⁶ In this scenario, the only path to

⁷⁶ Cho Chung-un, "President's Veto Roils Assembly," *Korea Herald*, June 25, 2015, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150625000669>.

success for the conservatives would have been to defect to the progressives and create a two-thirds majority sufficient to override a presidential veto. However, the conservatives had no intention of overriding the president, which made their plan to compromise against the president's wishes even more puzzling. In the end, conservative floor leader Yoo Seung-min stepped down months after the incident.⁷⁷

Historical data before the implementation of the National Assembly Amendment Act also shows similar patterns regarding the power of the presidency. The presidency of Roh Tae-woo (of the conservative Democratic Justice Party) illustrates what was possible with and without a simple majority in the National Assembly. Before the 1988 National Assembly elections, President Roh enjoyed a simple majority in the National Assembly (148 of 276 seats). Having control of both the National Assembly and the presidency, President Roh showed some inclination to compromise with the opposition parties; however, he used his numbers advantage to push laws unilaterally through the National Assembly. Shortly after taking office, major political parties sought to amend the National Assembly election law; however, they could not compromise on the number of electoral districts. The ruling conservative party and the conservative minor party (New Democratic Republican) led by Kim Jong-pil favored a multi-district system, while the opposition, led by Kim Young-sam (Reunification Democratic) and Kim Dae-jung (Peace and Democracy), favored a single member district system.⁷⁸ Even after President Roh compromised with the opposition toward a single member district system, minor disagreements stalled a joint bill's being passed. Instead of coming to an agreement with the opposition party, President Roh used his advantage in the National Assembly and unilaterally pushed through the revised election law.⁷⁹ Although President Roh was willing to compromise, he used his advantage when needed.

⁷⁷ "Ruling Saenuri Party Floor Leader Yoo Seung-min Resigns," *KBS World Radio*, July 12, 2015, http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_hotissue_detail.htm?No=10042109.

⁷⁸ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1992), 222.

⁷⁹ Sam Jameson, "S. Korea Passes Election Law That Favors Rural Areas," *Los Angeles Times*, March 8, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-03-08/news/mn-625_1_election-law.

When his party lost its majority in the 1988 National Assembly elections, holding the presidency limited the extent of what the opposition could do in the National Assembly. In that election, the Democratic Justice Party lost its majority in winning only 125 of 299 seats in the National Assembly. While the DJP was the largest party in the National Assembly, the opposition parties formed an alliance that enabled them to force compromises upon the president. During this period, the opposition was able to obtain the release of political prisoners and reform the judiciary branch to make it more independent from executive influence.⁸⁰ While the progressives were able to further democratize the central government, its attempted expansion of powers of the National Assembly—an attempt to expand legislative powers by having the ability to order judicial warrants to testify before the National Assembly—was met with resistance from President Roh.⁸¹ After having their bills vetoed, the opposition was forced to compromise and instead held hearings into investigations. In 1989, while Roh did not have a majority in the National Assembly, he displayed why holding the presidency alone is of paramount importance in South Korea.

If 1988 in South Korea could be summarized as a year of liberalization of the government by the opposition, 1989 could be summarized as a year of reversion of policies set forth by the progressive parties. During this period, President Roh used societal pressures to justify his reversal policies set forth by the progressives. In 1989, South Korea was marred in protests; farmers were rioting against the government's liberalization of agriculture trade.⁸² A left-leaning protest group, the National Association of University Student Councils, was challenging government policies against North Korea. There was a nationwide labor strike against Hyundai, and students waged violent protest against the police, taking the lives of seven police officers. In 1988, the opposition curbed the power of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). Their reason was the agency's human rights violations amid investigations. Furthermore, the opposition limited domestic operations conducted by the agency and made classified

⁸⁰ Savada and Shaw, *South Korea*, 223.

⁸¹ Ibid., 224.

⁸² Ibid., 239.

information available to the public for transparency purposes. As the crisis escalated, opposition policies against the Agency for National Security Planning were reversed. Under the guise of the National Security Act, the president authorized the ANSP to conduct investigations into journalists with antigovernment sentiments, arresting individuals who visited North Korea without authorization, breaking into opposition headquarters during by-elections, and banning printed materials that were anti-government in nature. Furthermore, cabinet members were reshuffled, with President Roh appointing a prosecutor who had worked under the authoritarian regime to lead the ANSP. The National Assembly's attempts to curb the power of the ANSP were stopped indefinitely, with the government strengthening the power of the ANSP by creating an amendment that allowed it to bypass constitutional law to investigate matters under the National Security Act.

If the conservative party is able to go beyond this and achieve the three structural dimensions of one-party dominance, it should in turn become dominant governmentally and set the national policy agenda. Since the democratization of South Korea, no party has achieved the three main structural criteria of one-party dominance. If the conservatives are able to become dominant, their ability to set the national *policy* agenda should be similar to what President Park Chung-hee was able to achieve during his authoritarian government, albeit without control over society as under authoritarian rule.

Chapter III will explore whether the conservative party is indeed in a position to achieve this.

2. Technical Analysis of Dominance in South Korea

Based on the definitions provided earlier, Tables 4 through 6 summarize the history and current status of dominance for South Korean political parties.

Table 4. Numerical, Bargaining and Chronological Dominance of Parties in South Korea—Presidency

Year	Party holding presidency	# of consecutive presidential wins by party
1988	Roh Tae-woo (Conservative)	N/A
1993	Kim Young-sam (Conservative)	2
1998	Kim Dae-jung (Progressive)	N/A
2003	Roh Moo-hyun (Progressive)	2
2008	Lee Myung-bak (Conservative)	N/A
2012	Park Geun-hye (Conservative)	2

Table 5. Numerical, Bargaining and Chronological Dominance of Parties in South Korea—National Assembly

Year	Party holding simple majority in National Assembly	# of consecutive holds in National Assembly
1988	None	N/A
1992	None	N/A
1996	None	N/A
2000	Conservative (Simple)	N/A
2004	Progressive (Simple)	N/A
2008	Conservative (Simple)	N/A

Table 6. Types of Dominance held by Political Parties in South Korea

Year	Party holding presidency	Number/bargaining position	Chronological
1988	Conservative	Weak	None
1993	Conservative	Weak	None
1998	Progressive	Weak	None
2003	Progressive	Complete	None
2008	Conservative	Complete	None
2012	Conservative	Weak	None

Ever since South Korea implemented a democratic voting system in 1987, no party has displayed chronological dominance; however, the conservative party has held the presidency for a longer period of time than its progressive counterparts. Under authoritarian rule, the conservative party controlled both the presidency and National Assembly for 25 years, from 1963 to 1988. Even after the democratization of South Korean, the conservative party continued to control the presidency for ten more years, until 1998–2008, when they were defeated by the progressives. Starting in 2008, the conservatives have again currently won two consecutive elections, giving them the presidency until at least 2018.

The same trend appears for the National Assembly. From 1988 to 1996, no single party was able to capture a simple majority (150 of 299 seats) in the National Assembly; only through mergers or alliances were parties able to capture a majority. In the 1988 National Assembly elections, the conservatives were able to capture a plurality but not a simple majority in the National Assembly: 125 of 299 seats. Two years later, they did capture the majority by merging with minor parties (the Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] and the New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP]), which gave them 219 of 299 seats. In the 1992 National Assembly elections, the conservative party would lose its simple majority by one seat (149 out of 299 seats). One could claim that the opposition

was close to claiming dominance in the National Assembly by virtue of its majority in two consecutive elections; however, this was achieved through a coalition between separate parties. There was no single opposition party that held a majority in the National Assembly.

In 2000, the conservative party held a simple majority and then the progressives held the same advantage during the 2004 elections. In the 2008 and 2012 elections, the conservatives became the first political party to have won two consecutive majorities in the National Assembly.

By Sartori's definition of chronological dominance, no party has shown chronological dominance in South Korea since democratization. However, the conservative party is in position to become a chronologically dominant party. As previously mentioned, with two consecutive wins already in the National Assembly (simple majority) and the presidency, the 2016 National Assembly and especially the 2017 Presidential elections will determine if they will become a dominant party. While Sartori's definition of chronological dominance is arbitrary, it still serves as a useful benchmark. And data since the last presidential election suggest favorable conditions for the conservatives to achieve this.

Since the last South Korean presidential election held in 2012, the conservatives in South Korea have solidified their position as the preferred party. According to a poll conducted by Gallup Korea (December 2015), 42% of respondents preferred the conservative party.⁸³ Compared to the conservatives, 22% of respondents were found to be in favor of the progressive party; this is a significant increase compared to polls that were conducted in November 2012.⁸⁴ During that period, according to the same polls conducted by Gallup Korea, conservative support was at 36%, with progressive support

⁸³ Gallup Korea, "Gallup Korea Daily Opinion: 192nd Issue–2015 December 3rd Week, 2015, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKoreaDailyOpinion_192%2820151218%29.pdf.

⁸⁴ Gallup Korea, "Gallup Korea Daily Opinion: 46th Issue–2012 November 5th Week," 2012, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKorea_Political_Index_046%2820121130%29.pdf.

at 32%.⁸⁵ Independents stayed roughly the same as in December 2015: 31% identified themselves as independents. This is similar to the 28% of individuals who identified themselves as independents in November 2012.⁸⁶

Between 2012 and 2015, then, the conservative party increased its support by 6%, while progressive party support decreased by 10%. With independents staying roughly the same, these numbers suggest that the conservatives were able to sway voters who supported the progressive party. With December 2015 polls indicating the conservative party having a 20% advantage over their opponents, it would be straightforward to conclude that they have a numbers advantage. If elections were held today, the progressives would theoretically need to win about 93.5% of independent voters to overtake the conservative party in South Korea. While the 2012 South Korean presidential election was a close contest between Park Geun-hye (51.6% of votes) and Moon Jae-in (48% of votes), the progressives were unable to overcome the 5% advantage held by the conservatives. The two parties split independent votes evenly with the conservatives taking 48% share compared to the progressives who took 51%.⁸⁷

Chapter III will explore what specific advantages the conservative party holds over the progressives—and, in turn, whether the conservatives should be able to carry this advantage over to the next elections and thereby achieve dominance by this thesis' definition (or, at least, approach dominant status by most *any* chronological definition).

⁸⁵ Gallup Korea, "Daily Opinion: 46th Issue."

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Gallup Korea, "Gallup Korea Daily Opinion: 48th–29th, 2012 Month of December Overview," 2012, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKorea_MonthlyReport_201212.pdf.

III. EXAMINING CAUSES OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE

This chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of a one-party dominant state, Japan, and South Korea. It will compare the factors that enabled Japan to become a state dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party and analyze whether similar conditions exist in South Korea. Other one-party dominant states could have been used as a comparison, such as the African National Congress in South Africa (in power since 1996) or the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (in power since 1982); however, the political structure of South Korea has been influenced to some extent by the Japanese political model.⁸⁸ While Japan's factors might not apply completely to South Korea, Japan provides a good starting point for analysis. Although numerous factors may contribute to one-party dominance, this thesis will focus on three major ones in the LDP's case: pork barrel, opposition fragmentation and bureaucracy, and control of the media. First, though, this chapter will explore why we should consider a one-party dominant system possible in South Korea in the first place.

A. POSSIBILITY OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE IN SOUTH KOREA

In examining the conservatives in South Korea, some scholars argue that they cannot be considered a legitimate party. One factor pointed to is that politics in South Korea are not well institutionalized; there is a lack of stability in parties. The Oxford Dictionary defines institutionalization as “the action of establishing something as a convention or norm in an organization or culture.”⁸⁹ In analyzing the institutionalization of South Korea, many scholars use Mainwaring’s four indicators of party system institutionalization: “(1) the stability of patterns of electoral competition, (2) the strength of party roots in society, (3) the legitimacy of parties, and (4) the structuring of party

⁸⁸ Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 90.

⁸⁹ Oxford Dictionaries, s. v. “institutionalization,” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/institutionalization.

organization.”⁹⁰ Kim, using these four indicators summarizes the party system institutionalization of South Korea as shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Party System Institutionalization in South Korea According to Mainwaring⁹¹

Dimension	South Korea
Patterns of inter-party competition	Volatile
Parties social roots	Regionalism
Legitimacy to party	Weak
Party-leader relationship	Subordinate

This section will mainly focus on Mainwaring’s first and third indicators, as our main focus is political parties. While Kim indicates that inter-party competition is volatile and party legitimacy is weak, he does not explain how those conclusions were made. This section pursues this in more detail.

First, scholars indicate that the volatile nature of inter-party competition is due to how South Korean political parties are organized internally: their hierarchical structure is the root cause of volatility. While South Korea has adopted modern democracy, it still infuses traditional values of Confucianism into politics. Kim and Park summarize Confucian values in South Korea as “respect for authority and elders, loyalty, and the importance of education and diligence, which are traditional values aimed at maintaining social order, harmony in the family.”⁹² Perhaps as a result in South Korea, political

⁹⁰ Scott Mainwaring, “Rethinking Party Systems Theory in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Importance of Party System Institutionalization,” Working Paper #260 (Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1998), <https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/260.pdf>.

⁹¹ Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization,” in *Handbook of Party Politics*, eds. Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage, 2006), 206–7.

⁹² Andrew Eungi Kim and Gil-sung Park, “Nationalism, Confucianism, Work Ethic and Industrialization in South Korea,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 33, no. 1 (May 2007): 44, doi: 10.1080/00472330380000041.

parties revolve around the leader instead of the party; the political party leader enjoys an enormous amount of power and the party exists to serve the leader.⁹³ One consequence of this leader-centric structure is that no party mechanism exists to elect the next party leader. In turn, factions develop within the party surrounding those who position themselves to lead the party and parties themselves sometimes change names and organizational structures upon leadership changes. This is thought to hinder South Korea's development of well-institutionalized—and perhaps even legitimate—political parties.

Steinberg holds that “in Korea, parties are little more than symbols around which candidates can rally their supporters. They remain the weakest link in the democratic process...”⁹⁴ This type of behavior by political parties can also be considered the genesis of party system weakness in South Korea. One reflection of poor party system institutionalization in South Korea is that a majority of the population does not affiliate themselves with a political party. Tan et al. finds that South Korea’s progressives and conservatives are not polarized as often thought. Data from the 1997 presidential election shows that nearly half of all individuals polled indicated a political affiliation while the other half considered themselves independents; this closely mirrors data collected by Gallup Korea.⁹⁵ During the 2012 Presidential elections, polls showed patterns close to those provided by Tan et al., with about 44% of the population affiliating themselves with a political party and the rest considering themselves independents.⁹⁶ An explanation of this outcome seems related to the leadership centric politics of South Korea. Since political leaders use the party as their personal platform for election, as stated by

⁹³ Joon Nak Choi, Myung-koo Kang, and Gi-wook Shin, “Democratic Transition and Intraparty Politics: The Distribution of Key Party Positions in Democratizing South Korea,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 19, no. 1 (spring 2014): 9, doi: 10.1353/jks.2014.0013.

⁹⁴ David I. Steinberg, “Korea: Triumph Amid Turmoil,” *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (April 1998): 80, doi: 10.1353/jod.1998.0033.

⁹⁵ Alexander Tan et al., “What If We Don’t Party? Political Partisanship in Taiwan and Korea in the 1990s,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 35, no. 1 (January 2000): 67–71, doi: 10.1177/002190960003500105.

⁹⁶ Gallup Korea, “Gallup Korea Daily Opinion: 30th Issue—2012 August 2nd Week,” 2012, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKorea_Political_Index_030%2820120813%29.pdf.

Steinberg, political leaders often implement policies that are not consistent with their party's paradigms. President Kim Young-sam, a leader of the opposition to the conservative party, later joined the conservative party and acted against his paradigm of reform by putting down labor unrest during his presidency. President Roh Moo-hyun of the progressive party enabled anti-American sentiments during his presidency, but contrary to his original political views initiated a free trade agreement with the United States. Given this, voters in South Korea likely base their vote on the individual and not the party.

While this thesis does not contest the findings of the abovementioned literature, it still contends that an analysis of a *one-party* dominant democracy is possible in South Korea. While scholars define South Korea as having weak parties due to their uninstitutionalized nature, Mainwaring provides a counterpoint, stating that "institutionalization need not rest on any specific kind of party; it can occur in systems with comparatively loose parties."⁹⁷ "Although weak institutionalization is typically associated with a variety of problems...an institutionalized party system is hardly a panacea."⁹⁸ In South Korea, while political party names change and the behavior of leaders sometimes run contrary to the stated ideals of their political parties, the general philosophy of conservatism or progressivism is carried from one political leader to the next. Since South Korea's democratization in 1987, the conservatives have changed the name of their party five times, but while a change in party names might indicate the creation of a new conservative party, this has not been the case. In South Korea, changing of party names is a political tactic used by conservatives and progressives to shed a negative image associated with the previous political party leader; the main members of the political party do not change. Rather, this tactic involves a continuation of the previous party—relabelled to give the impression that a new party has been created. The history of the conservative party also shows that even when names have changed, voters

⁹⁷ Mainwaring, "Rethinking Party Systems," 10.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

have carried over to the new political party.⁹⁹ Therefore, in South Korea, instead of narrowly focusing on the potential dominance of a *particular* conservative party, it is more appropriate to take a broader approach and analyze whether “the conservative party” might become dominant.

B. PORK BARREL POLITICS

1. Japan

One method dominant parties use to influence the population and obtain votes is pork barrel politics. In Japan, pork barrel spending can be considered a core component of politics for the dominant LDP. Fukui and Fukai explain that “Japanese voters are mobilized at election time mainly by the lure of pork barrel, only marginally by policy issues...”¹⁰⁰ Japanese politics is heavily influenced by clientelistic privileges; districts are heavily dependent upon the central government for funding. Therefore, districts are more inclined to vote for incumbent members to keep the flow of funds going through their regions. Furthermore, as members of the dominant party, LDP legislators are able to garner votes in their region by pulling pork into the region, which incentivizes citizens to vote for the party. The opposition, meanwhile, lacks connections with the bureaucracy that would bring pork to their perspective regions. Unlike policy positions, these cannot be developed while in opposition.

2. South Korea

a. Pork Barrel and Votes

In South Korea, the party that controls the presidency has an advantage over their political opponents when it comes to the use of pork barrel to influence politics. According to Article 54 of the South Korean Constitution, it gives the president power to create the fiscal budget which is then reviewed by the National Assembly for approval.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Haesook Chae, “The Fluid Middle in South Korean Politics,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 50, no. 5 (October 2015): 502, doi: 10.1177/0021909614558321.

¹⁰⁰ Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeko N. Fukai, “Pork Barrel Politics, Networks, and Local Economic Development in Contemporary Japan,” *Asian Survey* 36, no. 3 (March 1996): 268–69, doi: 10.2307/2645692.

¹⁰¹ “Constitution of the Republic of Korea,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

If any new expenditures or changes to the budget are deemed necessary by the National Assembly under Article 57, those changes must be approved by the President.¹⁰² This gives great power to the president regarding how those funds are distributed. From a macro level, according to Kwon, subsidy distribution by the central government was distributed to swing-vote regions.¹⁰³ While Kwon provides statistical evidence that government subsidies favor swing regions compared to core regions, though, the study fails to specifically mention how those funds target specific sectors to direct votes to the party.

Horiuchi and Lee attempt to fill in this missing distribution information. Their data compare vote shares to pork barrel distribution by region. Their independent variables include voters' occupation and age and their districts' population density and metropolitan character. As with Kwon's study, while Horiuchi and Lee's data show connections between pork barrel and voting in a region, they still do not answer how those funds are distributed and which sectors of the population those funds target, which would in turn translate into how individuals choose to vote. Kwon does acknowledge that information that might provide a more solid causal link between subsidies and voting is not available due, since data on distribution of subsidies were not available for analysis.¹⁰⁴ While specific subsidy distribution data were not available, analysis of the number of public projects in the area was.

Kim and Lee state that “a politician’s local public good provision such as large-scale public projects funded by the central government has positive impact on his reelection.”¹⁰⁵ This suggests that decentralized funding from the central government is not intended to positively impact presidential elections; its purpose seems to be to assist regional politicians for reelection. This seems plausible, as there is a negative popular

¹⁰² “Constitution of the Republic of Korea,” National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

¹⁰³ Hyeok-yong Kwon, “Targeting Public Spending in a New Democracy: Evidence from South Korea,” *British Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (April 2005): 338, doi: 10.1017/S0007123405000177.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 336.

¹⁰⁵ Jaehoon Kim and Hojun Lee, “Political Economy of Public Investment Projects,” *Korea Development Institute* 14 (2012): 52, http://cid.kdi.re.kr/cid_eng/public/report_read05.jsp?1=1&pub_no=12908.

connotation to the central government's influencing the population to garner votes. This is most likely due to the degree of clientelism that was prevalent before the democratization of South Korea. During the authoritarian rule of president Park Chung-hee, a close relationship existed between the state and business conglomerates (*chaebol*). The state directly developed the conglomerates, who in return provided support to the state, thus bringing legitimacy to the authoritarian government. As these practices became the norm, clientelistic behavior continued to be prevalent after democratization. In order for *chaebols* to keep the benefits that were provided by the government, they were required to provide contributions to the current regime. If they did not contribute to the government, they would see sudden law changes that would make it difficult for them to continue their business. Through this method, President Roh Tae-woo accumulated a \$650 million slush fund from contributions that he received from the conglomerates.¹⁰⁶ Former President Kim Yong-sam, who initiated reforms to corruption, was also found to have violated campaign rules and future Korean President Kim Dae-jung admitted to taking monetary donations from then President Roh Tae-woo.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, because of the negative image associated with smaller-scale pork barrel politics by previous administrations, instead of targeting a specific group with pork barrel, presidents initiate large scale projects that target regions.

During his term in office, President Roh Moo-hyun initiated a plan to build an expressway that connected Seoul to Sejong City to cut down on commuting times to the capital; this is a region of South Korea that is highly contested by both parties during elections. This project continued as the Lee Myung-bak administration funded the project, with current President Park Geun-hye finally executing the construction. Furthermore, President Roh Moo-hyun attempted to move the capital to Sejong City, but that plan was deemed unconstitutional by the Korean Supreme Court. The targeting of swing regions and the continuation of projects into the region seems to verify that pork barrel is being concentrated into contested regions, as stated by Kwon. That said, it is

¹⁰⁶ Verena Blechinger, "Report on Recent Bribery Scandals, 1996–2000," United Nations Public Administration Network, October 2000, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN013119.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

difficult to directly link pork barrel spending to positive results that enable a party to obtain a simple majority in the National Assembly.

Regardless of how pork barrel politics affects voting in South Korea, these findings support the idea that pork barrel is not an advantage that is strictly held by the conservative party. In Japan, it is evident that pork barrel spending is able to keep the LDP in power; in South Korea, that advantage is used by both parties. Woo mentions two methods in which pork barrel is distributed to regions: through local allocation taxes and national subsidies.¹⁰⁸ The use of local allocation taxes as pork barrel is ruled out, as their distribution is set by law and cannot be easily manipulated. National subsidies are more discretionary, allowing manipulation by the central government. Therefore, when the central government and the National Assembly discuss the distribution of national subsidies, local governments spend a significant amount of time trying to obtain those subsidies, which suggests that national subsidies are used in pork barrel politics.¹⁰⁹ In tracking the amount of national subsidies from 1989–2008, Woo found that during non-election periods, national subsidies were targeted toward regions that were core supporters of the incumbent party; during election periods, the central government diverted national subsidies to swing regions.¹¹⁰ Overall, even with the fluctuation of subsidy distribution before and after elections, Woo found that core supporters received more subsidies compared to swing supporters.¹¹¹ These findings suggest that the conservatives and progressives equally use national subsidies to influence the outcome of legislative and presidential elections, reinforcing the idea that no party holds an advantage in pork barrel in South Korea.

In South Korea, it is difficult to prove that pork barrel has a significant effect in generating votes for the conservative party. While studies conducted by Horiuchi, S. Lee, Kim, H. Lee, and Woo display that parties target swing and core regions with national

¹⁰⁸ Chang-kang Woo, “Electoral Cycles in Pork Barrel Politics: Evidence from South Korea 1989–2008,” *Electoral Studies* 38 (June 2015): 51, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2015.02.013.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 49–50.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 56.

subsidies, there is no data to link pork barrel to increased votes for the incumbent party. Although Tables 8 and 9 might be seen to suggest that national subsidies into swing regions netted a positive result for the president's party in obtaining more seats in the National Assembly; however, this conclusion would be a leap of interpretation, as there are other factors that may have contributed to a region's voting a specific way.

Table 8. Combined Total Number of Seats Captured in Swing Regions by Party
(Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Chungcheong Provinces)¹¹²

Year / party in control of presidency	Conservative	Progressive
1992 / Conservative	47*	35
1996 / Conservative	48*	28
2000 / Progressive	38	56*
2004 / Progressive	31	80*
2008 / Conservative	73*	31
2012 / Conservative	46	65*

¹¹² Adapted from Republic of Korea National Election Commission, "Past Elections," 2015, <http://info.nec.go.kr/main/showDocument.xhtml?electionId=0000000000&topMenuId=VC&secondMenuId=VCCP09>.

Table 9. Historical Data of Votes Won by Party in Swing Regions¹¹³

		Region		
Year	Party	Seoul	Gyeonggi	Chungcheong
1992	Conservative	16*	18*	13*
	Progressive	25	8	2
1996	Conservative	27*	18*	3*
	Progressive	18	10	0
2000	Conservative	17	18	3
	Progressive	28*	22*	6*
2004	Conservative	16	14	1
	Progressive	32*	35*	13*
2008	Conservatives	40*	32*	1
	Progressives	7	17	7*
2012	Conservatives	16	21	9*
	Progressives	30*	29*	6

These factors could include the amount of younger voters vs. older voters that showed up to the poll: younger voters tend to vote for the progressives while older voters vote conservative. Other factors could include stances on economic, foreign affairs, and other national policy agendas that may have encouraged voters to vote a specific way. In trying to link pork barrel to voting behavior in South Korea, there emerges no conclusive evidence that pork barrel spending has a significant impact on votes for the incumbent party.

¹¹³ Adapted from Republic of Korea National Election Commission, “Past Elections,” 2015, <http://info.nec.go.kr/main/showDocument.xhtml?electionId=0000000000&topMenuId=VC&secondMenuId=VCCP09>.

b. Efficient Use of Pork Barrel

Evidence suggests that no party holds an advantage over the other in using pork barrel in South Korea—both parties use pork equally to further their political agenda—although society’s general perception is that pork is at times more beneficial for the conservative party. This is most likely due to the environment the conservative party created during the authoritarian regime, in which they set the precedent on the distribution of pork in the country. As the party that spearheaded the economic miracle from 1965–1980, the conservatives solidified pork barrel distribution practices that continue to this day. Under the conservative authoritarian regime and developmental state model, the conservatives used pork barrel to further their industrial goals. President Park was able to monopolize power and enforce enduring economic policies that were necessary for South Korea to grow; he legitimized his rule with results.¹¹⁴ One method was the distribution of de facto pork barrel not only to citizens or regions, but also to the conglomerates themselves. Park’s economic policies allowed only one method through which companies could obtain loans. This allowed the government to dictate how those loans would be used by businesses; it kept companies in check and forced them to comply with government inputs to receive government support and incentives.¹¹⁵ Johnson explains that in Korea, “80% of funds were obtained by the government banking system while 20% came from internal equity.”¹¹⁶ The purpose of heavy internal financing was to control private firms by offering incentives in executing economic policies.¹¹⁷ When companies did not benefit from economic policy, the government had the ability to manipulate and underwrite loans, which helped business to operate despite losses.¹¹⁸ Through this process, under the authoritarian regime, the conglomerates became central to the growth of the South Korean economy. While some may question

¹¹⁴ Johnson, “Political Institutions,” 148–49.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 147–48.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

how subsidiary funding for conglomerates has an impact on voting in South Korea, this thesis argues that pork distribution to the conglomerates matter.

During the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, the progressives decided to move away from a hardline policy toward North Korea and transition to a softer, “Sunshine” Policy. The main idea behind the Sunshine Policy was to soften North Korea’s stance toward the South through economic assistance and interaction. Although President Kim pledged to “root out political corruption by severing close ties between the big business and the government,” the system required him to use conglomerates to further his political agenda.¹¹⁹ To successfully implement the Sunshine Policy, President Kim pragmatically and secretly worked with Hyundai to provide financial aid to North Korea, leading to what would become known as the cash-for-summit scandal. Korean prosecutors found that a total of \$500 million was sent to North Korea via Hyundai subsidiary groups.¹²⁰ In return for its cooperation, Hyundai was promised rights to the tourism project in Mt. Kumgang and development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea. When President Kim admitted to the financing of \$500 million that may have led to the Inter-Korean summit in 2000, his reputation and the credibility of the Sunshine Policy were undermined.¹²¹ When the conservatives tried the opposite approach in not providing pork to the conglomerates, it became difficult to further their political agenda—for example, President Lee Myung-bak’s Green Growth Policy, noted in Chapter I.¹²²

Although pork is used (or misused) similarly by both political parties, the perception that the conservatives better manage the economy does help them during elections. During the 2007 presidential elections, Lee Myung-bak was largely elected based on the perception of his being able to stimulate the economy. Past progressive voters turned to President Lee, stating, for example, that “I’ve always voted for liberals,

¹¹⁹ Young Whan Kihl, “The Past as Prologue: President Kim Dae Jung’s Legacy and President Roh Moo-hyun’s Policy Issues and Future Challenges,” in *A Turning Point: Democratic Consolidation in the ROK and Strategic Readjustment in the US–ROK Alliance*, ed. Alexandre Y. Mansourov (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005), 8.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 8–9.

¹²² Heo, “Political Economy,” 522.

but this time the economy became such a huge issue.”¹²³ Although Lee’s Green Growth policy to simulate the economy was a failure, overall he continued to spread pork to the conglomerates in the name of economic competitiveness. According to the National Assembly Budget Office, in 2012 the conservatives spent a total of \$673.9 million in direct pork subsidies to conglomerates.¹²⁴ According to Samsung, these pork subsidies enable them to stay competitive against the world market.¹²⁵ With the top 10 conglomerates making up 76% of South Korean GDP, and with continued support for the conglomerates, this perception will continue to draw votes for the conservative’s party when the economy is the forefront of elections.¹²⁶

C. FRAGMENTATION OF OPPOSITION

1. Japan

Another enabler of Liberal Democratic Party dominance in Japan has been the fragmentation of the opposition. During the initial stages of dominance by the LDP during the 1950s, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was the main opposition party in Japan. During this period, the LDP enjoyed a two-to-one vote advantage over the main opposition; as time progressed, the JSP would see defections that would create a multi-party system in Japan. Before the elections of 1960, right wing members of the JSP defected to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Furthermore, during the 1970s, Japan would see the creation of the Buddhist Clean Government Party (CGP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP). Before the creation of multiple opposition parties in Japan, during the 1958 elections, the JSP had captured 92% of the opposition vote; however, after the creation of multiple opposition parties, by 1976, their share of the opposition

¹²³ Norimitsu Onishi, “Conservative Wins Vote in South Korea,” *New York Times*, December 20, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/world/asia/20korea.html?_r=0.

¹²⁴ Lee Wan and Ryu Yi-geun, “Samsung Receives More Than US\$155 Million in Government Subsidies,” *Hankyoreh*, February 4, 2014, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/622549.html.

¹²⁵ “Samsung Phones Subsidy Ratio Higher than Apple and HTC,” ABI Research, June 27, 2013, <http://www.abiresearch.com/press/samsung-phones-subsidy-ratio-higher-than-apple-and/>.

¹²⁶ Kim Yon-se, “Top 10 Conglomerates’ Sales Equal 76% of GDP,” *Korea Herald*, August 27, 2012, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120827000963>.

votes was reduced to 44%.¹²⁷ Furthermore, amid this fragmentation the opposition essentially competed among themselves, splitting the number of legislative seats available. During the 1969 elections, the LDP was only able to obtain 48% of the votes; however, they were able to win 59% of the seats.¹²⁸ Therefore, the fragmentation of the opposition can be identified as contributing to LDP dominance in government.

2. South Korea

Similar to the LDP opposition in Japan, the conservatives' opponents in South Korea seem to be fragmented; however, fragmentation has similarly caused the conservative party to lose presidential elections. In this section we will specifically analyze two presidential elections, between which fragmentation has affected both parties.

a. *South Korean Presidential Election of 1987*

Similar to Japan, democratic South Korea started as a two-party system that eventually evolved into a multi-party system. The authoritarian government continued its presence in democracy through the Democratic Justice Party, while the main opposition party was the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). Within the NKDP, there were two prominent leaders who would eventually take the presidency in Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung; while the NKDP was led by Lee Min-woo, the two Kims held significant influence within the party.¹²⁹ Initially when Lee tried to compromise with the DJP in forming a parliamentary government in exchange for democratic government reforms, this was met with resistance within from the two Kims. Eventually, the two Kims would split, forming their own parties and fragmenting the opposition even further. Kim Young-sam formed the Reunification Democratic Party, taking 66 out of 90 NKDP members to his party.¹³⁰ Initially Kim Dae-jung joined the RDP as an advisor; however, a power struggle would ensue between the two Kims.

¹²⁷ Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan, *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), 46.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 47.

¹²⁹ Han Sung-joo, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 53, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644872>.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 53.

Before the 1987 South Korean presidential elections, the two Kims could not settle on which individual should run as president; both Kims saw themselves as heroes of democracy and refused to back down.¹³¹ Kim Young-sam saw himself as appealing to a broad range of voters and as having the ability to unite the nation under the party. On the other hand, Kim Dae-jung saw himself as an embodiment of political activism who suffered under the authoritarian regime for the sake of democracy, and therefore as representing the population who similarly suffered under the authoritarian regime.¹³² After trying to compromise with one another to settle on a single candidate, the two ultimately ran against each other during the 1987 presidential elections; their failure to compromise would be their downfall. Roh Tae-woo of the Democratic Justice Party received 36.6% of the votes, while Kim Young-sam (28%) and Kim Dae-jung (27%) together received 55% of the votes, but neither received as many as Roh.¹³³ If the opposition had compromised before the 1987 election, it is highly likely that they would have been able to defeat the conservatives.

b. South Korean Presidential Election of 1997

The conservatives would face the same consequences of fragmentation during the 1997 presidential elections. The DJP had settled on Kim Dae-jung as the candidate who would represent them. For the conservatives, the nomination was complicated by internal politics that would eventually fragment the party. Compared to previous administrations, during which a successor was selected within the party, an open election was held between conservative candidates. After narrowing down the candidates from nine, the two candidates remaining for the conservative party were Lee Hoi-chang and Lee In-je; Lee Hoi-chang would win the runoff election, making him the New Korea Party (NKP) nominee.¹³⁴ Lee Hoi-chang's nomination was problematic in that he was an outsider to

¹³¹ Han, "South Korea in 1987," 55.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ "Social Research," Gallup Korea, accessed December 1, 2015, <http://www.gallup.co.kr/english/social.asp>.

¹³⁴ Tong Whan Park, "South Korea in 1997: Clearing the Last Hurdle to Political-Economic Maturation," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 1 (January 1998): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645463>.

individuals who were loyal to President Kim Young-sam.¹³⁵ Furthermore, during this period, polls also suggested that Lee Hoi-chang was trailing behind Kim Dae-jung and Lee In-je for the presidency.¹³⁶ Therefore, Lee In-je could not accept the nomination of Lee Hoi-chang as the NKP nominee and left the party to form his own party called the New People Party (NPP).¹³⁷ This was problematic for Lee Hoi-chang, as Lee In-je not only took party loyalists with him, but also split the conservative vote between the two parties. Kim Dae-jung would win the 1997 election, capturing 40.3% of the votes, while the conservatives captured 57.9% of the votes; Lee Hoi-chang received 38.7% of the votes while Lee In-je captured 19.2% of the votes.¹³⁸ If the conservatives were able to compromise on a single candidate, it would have most likely given them the presidential election of 1997.

c. The Ahn Chul-soo Effect—Opposition Fragmentation

Examining the conservative and progressives from the 2012 presidential elections suggests that fragmentation will continue to be a problem for the progressives, which will strengthen the conservative party. The current fragmentation of the progressive party seems similar to that of the presidential election of 1987. Furthermore, the progressives seem to be in a state of disarray, with an outsider having managed to fragment the party. This is unusual; since democratization, when fragmentations occurred, they occurred among insiders within the parties. This was mainly due to the insulated nature of politics within South Korea, which made it difficult for outsiders to bring about change in an established party. During the 2012 South Korean presidential elections, though, Ahn Chul-soo challenged that perception; currently he has managed to challenge and fragment the institutionalized nature of the progressive party.

Ahn is not a career politician. He started his career as a medical doctor and transitioned into business, creating AhnLab in 1995, which gave him fame for providing

¹³⁵ Park, “South Korea in 1997,” 4.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Gallup Korea, “Social Research.”

free antivirus software to individuals in South Korea. Through his success with AhnLab and books on computers, he enjoyed rising popularity with young individuals. When Ahn contemplated running for the 2011 Seoul mayoral race, many young voters supported the idea of his running against the Grand National Party as an independent.¹³⁹ In the end, he stepped aside in favor of independent Park Won-soon.

Ahn would reappear during the 2012 South Korean presidential race. Ahn ran as an independent against Park Guen-hye and Moon Jae-in; however, he fragmented the progressive vote, which undermined Moon's chances of defeating Park. Ahn's popularity within the progressive base was due to the perception that he was not a career politician and could bring about change within the political scene.¹⁴⁰ According to polls taken in October 2012, Ahn's lead against Moon varied from 2 to 10%, and he remained even with conservative party candidate Park.¹⁴¹ When elections headed toward November, Ahn could not overcome the progressive establishment, as Moon began to lead Ahn at the polls by 2 to 9%.¹⁴² Furthermore, as elections drew closer in December, Ahn's lack of governmental experience started to hurt him. Although the main progressive party was able to take the lead, it was still splitting the progressive vote with Ahn, which would assure a victory for conservative candidate Park; in the end, Ahn conceded to Moon. Although Ahn stated publicly that this move was made in order to defeat the conservative party, it was in fact, a political move to establish himself within the progressive party. Two years after the 2012 presidential elections, Moon would join forces with Ahn again to create a new progressive party, the New Politics Alliance for Democracy. This alliance would be short, though, as Ahn would leave the NPAD on December 2015, which initiated the current pattern of progressive fragmentation.

¹³⁹ "Ahn's Graceful Withdrawal," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, September 8, 2011, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2941261>.

¹⁴⁰ O. Fiona Yap, "South Korea in 2014: A Tragedy Reveals the Country's Weaknesses," *Asian Survey* 55, no. 1 (January-February 2015): 136, doi: 10.1525/as.2015.55.1.132.

¹⁴¹ Gallup Korea, "Gallup Korea Daily Political Index: 31 October 2012," 2012, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKorea_Political_Index_Daily%2820121031%29.pdf.

¹⁴² Gallup Korea, "Daily Opinion: 46th Issue."

When Ahn merged with Moon to create the NPAD, he co-chaired the party with a former progressive presidential candidate Kim Han-gill. Some viewed Ahn's ability as an outsider to co-chair the NPAD as connected to a change in the candidate nomination process. Like the NPAD, the conservatives were also in the process of revising party nominations for elections toward a more open process; however, they reversed their decision and decided to stick to their traditional methods. In ultimately retaining party-chosen candidates for particular regions, the conservatives maintained an advantage in putting forth individuals that appealed to these regions. Given this conservative advantage in the candidacy process, the progressives would also reverse themselves and stick to the traditional method of party leaders' choosing candidates. Due to this back-and-forth process of reform, the NPAD started to lose members. In response to the conservative party, Ahn ultimately chose individuals who were close to him for the 2014 by-elections, which resulted in a victory for the conservatives, who won 11 seats compared to four for the progressives.¹⁴³ Ahn and Kim would resign as a result; however, Ahn's departure from the NPAD is puzzling.

When Ahn announced that he would leave the NPAD to create his own political party, his reason for departure was his inability to reform the NPAD as a member. Furthermore, Ahn called for the resignation of Moon to reform the leadership following their loss in the 2014 by-elections.¹⁴⁴ During the by-elections, Ahn had the chance as the co-chair to reform the political process and proceed with an open candidate selection; however, it was Ahn who stuck to a party selection method. Therefore, it is puzzling as to why Ahn would blame Moon when he had the ability to make changes as the co-chair. Regardless, with Moon refusing to back down as the NPAD leader, Ahn would leave the party on December 2015 to create his own party, the People's Party.¹⁴⁵ It is also during this period that NPAD would change its party name to the Minjoo (Democratic) Party. Ahn's defection is worrying for the Minjoo Party, as he managed to bring with him senior

¹⁴³ Yap, "South Korea in 2014," 137.

¹⁴⁴ "Ahn Cheol-soo Leaves NAPD," *Korea Times*, December 14, 2015, <http://www.koreatimesus.com/ahn-cheol-soo-leaves-npad/>.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

progressive members from the NPAD. Furthermore, individuals that were cast aside by the Minjoo Party are turning toward the People's Party in hopes of getting a fair chance of running in the upcoming (as of this writing) April 2016 elections. According to Gallup polls, the Minjoo Party holds a favorability rating of 26% compared to the People's Party's 9%;¹⁴⁶ however, with the Minjoo Party's recent announcement that it plans to incumbent party members for the upcoming April 2016 elections, it is likely that more individuals will join the People's Party, and this might further legitimize the party.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, since the progressives have grown fragmented through internal politics, it is likely that the conservatives, as one cohesive party, will win more seats than their progressives counterparts during the April 2016 National Assembly elections.

D. CONTROL OF THE MEDIA

In examining one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, many analysts examine the internal structural advantages of the LDP that led to its dominance. Fewer try to link external factors to current LDP resurgence in Japan, specifically media influence by the government. In Japan, evidence suggests that there has been an increased amount of use of the media by the Prime Minister's office compared to the past. In this section we will examine the structure/state of the Japanese media and possible advantages it provides to the LDP. Furthermore, we will explore whether these same factors apply to South Korea's conservatives.

1. Japan

In Japan, there is a growing consensus that de facto press regulation has inhibited differentiation of media outlets from each other. Major newspapers and media outlets in Japan belong to press clubs (*kisha*), which serve as gateways for accessing government information. Furthermore, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (*Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai*) acts as an enforcer of rules and controls the behavior of the press

¹⁴⁶ Gallup Korea, "Gallup Korea Daily Opinion: 200th Issue–2016 March 1st Week," 2016, http://panel.gallup.co.kr/Contents/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKoreaDailyOpinion_200%2820160304%29.pdf.

¹⁴⁷ Kim Hyo-jin, "10 Opposition Lawmakers Lose Ticket for April Elections," *Korea Times*, February 24, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/116_198954.html.

clubs. Additionally, without membership in the association, individuals do not have the ability to join press clubs and are denied access to news conferences and briefings by the Japanese government.¹⁴⁸ As an example, when a school massacre occurred in Osaka Prefecture in 2001, individuals who were not members of the press clubs were barred from attending the police briefs; members of the press clubs were first provided with the information and it was later released to non-members.¹⁴⁹

Within the press clubs, reporters abide by an agreement called the *kokuban kyōtei*, also known as blackboard agreements; upcoming government briefs and news announcements are communicated via blackboards that are located in the press clubs.¹⁵⁰ The purpose of the blackboard agreement was to prevent competition among reporters who seek to obtain a better story than their colleagues and to equally distribute information to the press. Once an announcement is made under the blackboard system, journalists are barred from individually gathering information about that event. With these regulations within the press clubs, news is easily manipulated by the government, and at times the news media conveys information to the population that has been shaped by the government. Through this system, it becomes an effective method to control and incentivizes the government to maintain close ties with the press.

Additionally, the LDP has tried to form a more personal relationship through “ban” (beat) journalism. In Japan, journalists sometimes have unfiltered access to the leadership in government; these individuals are known in Japan as *ban-kisha*. These individuals can be considered a part of the entourage of the politician; they start and end their day at the politician’s homes. Through this close interaction, ban-journalists are often given previews of important information that is not available through formal channels. This is with the understanding that the information available is all off-the-record. Given the amount of time a ban-journalist spends with the politician and the information that is made available to them due to this close relationship, journalists often

¹⁴⁸ Kanako Takahara, “Press Clubs: Exclusive Access to, Pipelines for Info.” *Japan Times*, January 30, 2007, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/01/30/reference/press-clubs-exclusive-access-to-pipelines-for-info/>.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

find it difficult to write negative stories on these politicians. Furthermore, they avoid negative press in order to maintain their off-the-record information. Additionally, politicians will often invest in ban-journalists knowing that some of them will become editors of major news outlets in the future.¹⁵¹ This mutually exclusive relationship that politicians and ban-journalists share creates soft control of information in Japan.

During the LDP's period of greatest dominance, from 1955 to 1993, there were instances of deliberate media involvement in supporting politicians. With the dominance of the LDP during this timeframe, news media coverage centered on factional battles within the LDP instead of battles between political parties.¹⁵² During this period, the media took an active role to manipulate who would become the leader of the LDP. Journalists would also take an active role in aligning themselves with politicians and educating them on media behavior in hopes of advancing their positions within their media organization. Claims that Tsuneo Watanabe (Chairman and Editor in Chief) of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* assisted Yasuhiro Nakasone in becoming the LDP's Prime Minister in 1982 and organized a meeting between opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa (Democratic Party of Japan [DPJ]) and Prime Minister Fukuda (LDP) in 2007 give some credence to the idea that strong media influence over politics exists in Japan.¹⁵³

2. South Korea

Unlike in Japan, the relationship between the Korean media and the government has been tumultuous. Korean media has been heavily controlled by the government. Before the 1952 elections, the president in South Korea was elected by the National Assembly; the party that held the majority of seats was most likely to win the presidency. During the National Assembly elections of 1952, the party of Rhee Syng-man lost the majority to their opponents. This jeopardized the reelection of Rhee Syng-man for the 1952 presidential elections. In order to change his political outlook, President Rhee

¹⁵¹ Takahara, "Press Clubs."

¹⁵² Nobuyuki Okumura, "The Backwardness of Japanese Political Journalism: Nonestablished Ethics and Unwritten Rules," Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 7, 2008, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080507_okumura_.pdf.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

declared martial law and imprisoned political opposition in the National Assembly.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, he revised the presidential election system, changing it from a National Assembly vote to a popular vote. Additionally, in order to curb opposition and dissent, he passed the Extraordinary Measures on Publications in 1954 to control the media.¹⁵⁵ In response, three dissenting newspapers (*Chungang Sinmun*, *DongA Ilbo*, and *Chosun Ilbo*), wrote critical reviews of President Rhee's policies.¹⁵⁶ In response, he required all newspaper agencies to be licensed and gave the state the right to censor material that was detrimental to it. Furthermore, the state gained the right to shut down newspapers that were detrimental to state affairs. Under the guise of the National Security Law, the president shut down all forms of opposition and silenced critics of the government. After the resignation of President Rhee in 1960, many of the stringent media laws enacted by President Rhee were abolished; Korea enjoyed a year free from persecution and censorship. During this period, a progressive newspaper was formed called the *Minjok Ilbo*; however, when President Park Chung-hee took office through a military coup in 1961, the president of the *Minjok Ilbo* was executed.¹⁵⁷

During the presidency of Park Chung-hee, restrictions on the media were further tightened; this was the period when media formed a close partnership with the government. President Park is recognized as the individual that lifted South Korea out of poverty through an export oriented economy. He developed closed relationships with the *chaebols* to deliberately develop the companies into the economic pillars of Korean society. One of the methods of controlling business was control of funds available to businesses; this kept companies in check and forced them to comply with the government to receive support and incentives.¹⁵⁸ During this period, big businesses started to move into the newspaper business in order to receive the benefits that were available by the government.

¹⁵⁴ Derek Jones, ed., *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1352.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Johnson, "Political Institutions," 148–49.

Under President Park, the Press Council Law was passed in 1964. Under this law, the government had the right to physically punish individuals that made false reports in the media; the boundaries of false reports were dictated by the government.¹⁵⁹ While the government delayed the implementation of the Press Council Law, it was replaced by the Press Card System in 1970. Through the Press Card System, the government directly controlled the hiring process of the media and ensured the dismissal of individuals whose ideas did not align with the authoritarian party.¹⁶⁰ In 1974, President Park implemented harsher laws to control the media. Journalists faced up to 15 years in prison for publishing material that was offensive to the government.¹⁶¹ Furthermore in 1975, President Park tightened the words of his 1974 policy. Through this new policy, in addition to publishing offensive material by journalists, he made it illegal to demonstrate against the government through “public media such as newspapers, broadcasts, or press services; or by any other means of expression, such as writings, books or recordings.”¹⁶² Individuals faced up to 15 years in prison and the government had the authority to shut down media outlets that supported such expression. After the assassination of President Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan continued the policies of his predecessor and further tightened those policies.

Like President Park Chung-hee, President Chun Doo-hwan took over the government through a military coup. Under the guise that the country was in danger, in 1980 he enacted the “Determination for Nation Salvation.”¹⁶³ President Chun removed 172 periodical publishers that were not aligned to the views of the government. Furthermore, in order to narrow the amount of information circulating in society, he merged broadcasting stations, reducing their number from 28 to 11.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, he enacted the Guidelines for Reporting which dictated what the press could or could not

¹⁵⁹ Jones, *Censorship*, 1352.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 1353.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

present through their media outlets.¹⁶⁵ During his time in office, more than 400 journalists were removed.¹⁶⁶

When the government transitioned from authoritarian rule to true democracy, restrictions on the media were also removed. Under the Basic Press Law, President Roh Tae-woo removed the Press Card System and the media no longer had to go through government censors before publishing. Immediately after the removal of government censors, “the number of daily papers doubled to 79, and 4600 weeklies and monthlies were now published.”¹⁶⁷ During this period, progressive newspapers such as the *Hankyoreh Sinmun* were established and the press was allowed to unionize. While President Roh bought freedom of the press, he still had the ability to revert back to use of the National Security Law, which still gave him the ability to arrest individuals that the government felt as a threat to national security. In 1989, President Roh arrested thousands of individuals that he deemed to be “praising, encouraging or siding with anti-state organizations.”¹⁶⁸

a. Current Media Operations

While press freedom has been operative since progressive President Kim Dae-jung took power in 1998, there is still distrust of traditional media in South Korea. Even if the traditional media operates like their western counterparts, the government still has operational control over the media. To better understand the government’s role, these operational aspects of the Korean media will be explored.

Similar to Japan, South Korea had a press club system called the *Kijadan*. The rules and operation of the press clubs and information sharing were similar to the *kisha* clubs of Japan—individuals who were not members of the club were denied access to government news releases. Unlike Japan, the consequences of breaking press club rules were more stringent in the case of Korea. In Japan, individuals who broke press club

¹⁶⁵ Jones, *Censorship*, 1353.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

rules would be barred temporarily and required to submit an apology letter to the press clubs. In South Korea, not only would the individual be barred from the press club, but the government would also pressure news organizations that continued to break press club rules. This would come in the form of government investigations into media outlets and as audits and tax investigations into members of the media. As in Japan, the government kept soft control over major news media organizations.

Furthermore, the state's control over public media can be seen through the appointment process of the president and its board members. For this study, two media broadcasting companies will be analyzed: the government owned Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and limited company Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). Being a state owned enterprise, KBS has its president appointed by the president of South Korea, and its board members are also appointment by the president, with recommendations made by the Korean Communications Commission (KCC).¹⁶⁹ MBC is owned by two entities; the Foundation for Broadcast Culture (a public corporation in which the government has a 70% stake) and the Jung-soo Foundation (30% stake).¹⁷⁰ The members of the Foundation for Broadcast Culture (FBC) are appointed by the KCC, who in turn appoints the president. Since there is heavy influence by the government, presidents and board members change depending upon who holds the presidency.

When President Roh Moo-hyun (Progressive) took office in 2003, he proceeded to replace the heads of both KBS and MBC with personnel supportive of his cause. As the President of KBS, President Roh appointed Jung Yeon-jo, a former employee of the progressive newspaper *Hankyoreh Daily* and supporter of the Roh administration.¹⁷¹ As the President of MBC, he appointed Choi Moon-soon, a hardline progressive.¹⁷² After taking office, Choi proceeded to replace the heads of 17 of 19 regional MBC stations

¹⁶⁹ Ki-sung Kwak, *Media and Democratic Transition in South Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 95.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 96.

¹⁷² Ibid., 95.

with individuals who were supportive of the progressive party.¹⁷³ In 2008, 10 days before the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak (Conservative), President Roh appointed Eom Ki-young to lead MBC.¹⁷⁴ While this analysis displays the amount of control the government has over the media, it still does not explain the public's mistrust of mainstream media; the catalyst for this mistrust can be found in 2005.

b. PD Notebook—2005

In 2004, Professor Hwang Woo-suk came into prominence when he published work claiming to clone the first human embryos and extract their stem cells.¹⁷⁵ In 2005, he made headlines when his team claimed to have cloned the first dog.¹⁷⁶ Through his achievements, he was heralded as a hero by the national media and called the pride of Korea. Going against the vein of the mainstream media, MBC's *PD Notebook* questioned the validity of the work done by Professor Hwang; they specifically brought into question the human stem cell research conducted by the research team. Soon afterwards, *PD Notebook* was vilified by the media and citizens for attempting to tarnish the work done by Professor Hwang. Newspaper outlets such as the *Chosun*, *JoongAng*, and *Dong-A* all rallied against *PD Notebook*.¹⁷⁷ Shortly after the program aired, MBC was forced to apologize for the work produced by the investigative program and was forced off the air for an extended period of time. On December 2005, *PD Notebook* was vindicated when an academic panel found that Professor Hwang fabricated his 2005 claims of cloning a dog.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, the same panel found that his 2004 work on stem cell research was

¹⁷³ Kwak, *Media and Democratic Transition*, 95.

¹⁷⁴ Beom-soo Park, "A Comparative Study of the Conflicts between Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) and Governments in the UK and South Korea" (fellowship paper, University of Oxford, 2011), 29, <http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/publication/comparative-study-conflicts-between-public-service-broadcasting-psb-and-governments-uk>.

¹⁷⁵ Charles Scanlon, "Korea's National Shock at Scandal," *BBC News*, January 13, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4608838.stm>.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Kim Tae-gyu and Lee Hyo-shik, "MBC Apologizes for Stem Cell Coercion," *Korea Times*, December 4, 2005, <http://web.international.ucla.edu/institute/article/34906>.

¹⁷⁸ Scanlon, "Korea's National Shock."

also fabricated.¹⁷⁹ In the aftermath, *PD Notebook* earned the label of being an accurate and honest program, while other media outlets were ridiculed for covering the media with emotion rather than facts. When *PD Notebook* earned the reputation of being an honest and accurate program from its viewers, it was easily manipulated by progressive supporters to run a disruption campaign against the conservatives in 2008.

c. PD Notebook—2008

From 1998 to 2008, the Korean presidency was held by the progressive party of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. February 2008 marked the transition from a progressive presidency to a conservative presidency. Two months after entering office, President Lee Myung-bak entered into negotiations with the United States over importing beef into South Korea. The two sides failed to negotiate on two previous occasions. In 2003, talks failed over mad cow disease in the U.S.¹⁸⁰ In 2007, talks stalled when bone fragments were found on imported beef.¹⁸¹ In 2008, the United States was adamant that the Free Trade Agreement would not be passed if Korea would not make concessions on the importation of U.S. beef into the country.¹⁸² In the end, President Lee agreed to the demands of the United States to start beef importation into Korea. When news got out of the president's decision, the public was wary because of the incidents that occurred in 2003 and 2007.

The progressives' supporters saw this as an opportunity and used *PD Notebook* to help stop the beef imports. Eleven days after the agreement between South Korea and the U.S., *PD Notebook* ran a segment calling into question the safety of United States beef and its dangers. Immediately after broadcasting their segment, it caused mass hysteria around the country, with citizens coming out into the streets to protest the decision of the president.¹⁸³ The protests grew out of control, to the point that barricades were made with

¹⁷⁹ Scanlon, "Korea's National Shock."

¹⁸⁰ Ian Howard, "Korean Media Bias and Government Intervention in Media," John Hopkins University, 2009, 59, http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2009_Yearbook_Howard.pdf.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., 59–60.

¹⁸³ Jack Kim, "Anti-U.S. Beef Protest Draws 100,000 S. Koreans," *Reuters*, May 31, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/31/us-korea-protest-idUSSEO21734120080531>.

shipping containers to block the entrance to the Blue House.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, because of the pressure of the protests, multiple cabinet ministers resigned in attempts to quell the protestors.¹⁸⁵

Two months after *PD Notebook* aired the segment on U.S. beef, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries requested an investigation into *PD Notebook* for fact distortion. As mentioned earlier, the president of MBC was appointed by a progressive president. Thus, there was no shock to the evidence found by the prosecution against *PD Notebook*. In investigating the scriptwriter (Kim Eun-hee) for *PD Notebook*, prosecutors found emails that showed bias against the conservative president. In an email conversation, Ms. Kim states,

While I've been looking for an item for *PD Notebook*, I was looking for ways to release my indignation over the outcome of the general election...I really get into making a program one or two times a year...This year's mad cow disease was one of them. I think that was because anger over Lee Myung-bak was at a peak at that time after the general election. Because I'm still very interested in the "fate of Lee," I've spent a lot of time watching the candlelight vigils and looking at Agora on Daum.¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, the translator for the show testified to prosecutors that the producers were purposefully misinterpreting information to fit their agenda. She stated that "*PD Diary*'s producers should have considered more thoroughly the possibility that the downer cow [that appeared in the broadcast] was actually infected with the disease. They should have provided an accurate impression about such a possibility to their viewers."¹⁸⁷

d. Control of Media by Conservatives

In the fallout of the *PD Notebook* segment, President Lee Myung-bak took measures to control major media outlets. Three months after the *PD Notebook* segment, the KCC fired the KBS president and replaced him with a former aide to President

¹⁸⁴ Choe Sang-hun, "South Korean Cabinet Offers to Resign," *New York Times*, June 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/world/asia/10iht-10korea.13595851.html?_r=0.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Howard, "Korean Media Bias," 62.

¹⁸⁷ Ser Myo-ja, "Prosecutors Expanding Probe into TV Report," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, June 27, 2008, <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2891646>.

Lee.¹⁸⁸ This process was not difficult, as the KCC president was also President Lee's campaign advisor during the presidential elections. The KCC further replaced the presidents of Yonhap Television News Station (YTN) and Arirang TV (a channel that provides Korean news in English) with supporters of President Lee during his presidential campaign.¹⁸⁹ The most critical replacement was the President of the Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO). KOBACO was an agency that represented all the broadcasting companies in Korea; on behalf of all the broadcasters, it sells advertising time to companies.¹⁹⁰ Control of KOBACO provided President Lee to control the media. If the KCC, on behalf of the president, were to blacklist companies, their advertising capabilities would be severely compromised. Therefore, control of KOBACO ensured that companies were supportive of the ruling party.

To further control the media, President Lee passed media reforms that allowed newspaper companies to also own a media company. Before these reforms, the two types of entities were separated to prevent undue influence over the media. The idea behind the liberalization law was to create more competition and provide differentiated news to society.¹⁹¹ While President Lee's intent was to open the market to competition, he only flooded the media market with more conservative news outlets. When the Korean government decided to grant channel rights after deregulating the media market in 2009, the top three conservative newspapers in South Korea were granted channels. They were *Chosun Ilbo* (TV Chosun), *Joong-ang Ilbo* (JTBC) and *Dong-A Ilbo* (Channel A). Furthermore, after the deregulation of the media market, it was more beneficial to be aligned with the government. Howard explains that "members of the private media corporations were often rewarded by the government in the forms of interest-free loans, tax favors, political offices, bureaucratic roles, and government positions."¹⁹² Furthermore they had access to government funds for, "overseas travel, housing loans,

¹⁸⁸ Howard, "Korean Media Bias," 69.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 70.

¹⁹² Ibid., 66.

money for their children's education, and the more traditional forms of graft, cash and gifts.”¹⁹³ Therefore, a perception exists within Korean civil society that big media only reports news that is within the spectrum of the government, in order to take advantage of the advertising outlets provided by the government. Furthermore, the president's influence over other media outlets gives him considerable power to abuse the media.

In South Korea, an irony exists in regards to the government and media. It is evident that manipulation and control over the media exists; however, citizens seem to separate the two entities in regards to trust. In a study conducted by Edelman, trust in the media was rated at 60% while trust in the government was rated at 40%.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, the top three trusted news sources were identified as KBS (state), Chosun Ilbo (Conservative), and JoongAng Ilbo (Conservative).¹⁹⁵ Although citizens realize that there is heavy influence by the government on mainstream media and conservative media outlets, they still turn toward them for information.

While conservatives have an advantage in the number of conservative news outlets, the manipulation of the media to advance conservative party agenda is questionable. Since the days of the authoritarian regime, evidence suggests that the government of South Korea has made efforts to control the media through laws and regulations in regards to the information that is reported from news agencies; however, media manipulation is not a unilateral advantage held by the conservatives. The progressives have also manipulated the media after taking office and have managed to disrupt policies of the conservatives. Therefore, it is difficult to consider the conservatives as having dominance over the media and thereby garnering votes for their party.

¹⁹³ Howard, “Korean Media Bias,” 66.

¹⁹⁴ Alan VanderMolen, “Asian Markets: The China Syndrome,” *Edelman Trust Barometer* (2008), <http://www.edelman.com/assets/uploads/2014/01/2008-Trust-Barometer-Executive-Summary.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

IV. CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to explore the possibility of one-party dominance by the conservatives in South Korea. It defined one-party dominance in the context of South Korea and explored its potential causes, with reference to the causes of Liberal Democratic Party dominance in Japan. The findings are inconclusive with regard to the possibility of one-party dominance by the conservatives in South Korea.

A. PEMPELS' THREE DIMENSIONS OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE— SOUTH KOREA

For the purposes of this thesis, and based on Pempel's work, one-party dominance is defined by dominance in three dimensions: dominance in number, in bargaining position, and chronologically.

In defining dominance in number and bargaining position in South Korea, a party might be said to fall into one of four categories, depending on its control of the presidency and its number of seats in the National Assembly: no, weak, strong, and complete dominance. Before the National Assembly Advancement Act of 2012, a party that held a simple majority (151 seats) could pass bills unilaterally through the National Assembly. After the passage of the 2012 Act, parties have needed to hold a three-fifths majority to bring a bill up to the plenary session to be voted upon by the National Assembly. Even though no party has obtained a three-fifths majority in the National Assembly in the history of democratic South Korea, dominance in number and bargaining position can still be achieved by holding the presidency. Since the president has veto powers over the National Assembly, if the president's party does not hold a simple majority over the opposition, it is forced to compromise with the incumbent party. The varying degrees of dominance that a party can achieve are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

In regards to defining chronological dominance, this thesis settled on Sartori's definition of three consecutive winning elections. In South Korea, no political party after democratization has won three consecutive majority elections in the National Assembly

or for the presidency. Currently, the conservative party has won two consecutive National Assembly and presidential elections. According to Sartori's definition, the conservatives are one majority win away in the National Assembly and presidential elections from meeting the criteria of chronological dominance.

B. CAUSES OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE—SOUTH KOREA

This thesis focused on three factors that helped the Liberal Democratic Party to become a dominant party in Japan. The first was the LDP's use of pork barrel to draw votes to the party. Voters were specifically attracted to candidates who could draw pork to their region, which allowed the LDP to dominate in elections over the opposition. In South Korea, pork is mostly controlled by the president, with little input from the National Assembly; this is made possible by Article 54 of the South Korea constitution, which gives the president power to create the budget. Furthermore, pork barrel in South Korea is distributed in the form of national subsidies, which can be directly manipulated by the central government. But while Horiuchi, S. Lee, Kim, H. Lee, and Woo try to link pork barrel to voting, the evidence is inconclusive. This thesis did argue that subsidy distribution to the conglomerates in South Korea matters. Although progressives favor minimizing the power that the conglomerates hold in South Korea, they are forced to work with them in order to further their political agenda. Furthermore, given the close association between the conservatives and the conglomerates, when the economy is at the forefront of elections, a majority of voters might default to the conservatives. Overall, given both parties' equal opportunity to distribute pork in South Korea, neither party holds an advantage in this area.

In Japan, another cause of LDP dominance was the fragmentation of opposition parties. In South Korea, similarly, both the conservatives and progressives have had instances in which internal fragmentation lost them the presidency. Currently, the progressives are fragmented into three different parties: the Minjoo, People's and Justice Parties. If history is any indication, if the progressives remain fragmented, the conservatives will most likely take the majority votes from the progressives during the National Assembly elections on April 2016. Furthermore, if this continues into the 2017

presidential elections, the conservatives will most likely win the presidency. If that occurs, the conservative party will have achieved chronological dominance. But the conservatives have suffered from fragmentation in the past as well.

Lastly, in examining the media as a source of one-party dominance in South Korea, no party holds an advantage. In Japan, the media naturally vectored toward the dominant LDP, providing favors and censoring material that would bring a bad image toward the party. Through its position as the dominant party, the LDP was able to passively manipulate the media to its advantage. In examining South Korea, the same advantages do not exist; the media is centrally controlled by the government, such that whoever takes the presidency is able to manipulate the media to his or her advantage. Furthermore, since the government has control over how the media earns revenue through advertising, the media is more inclined to support the incumbent party. If party dominance is ever achieved in South Korea, media control might reinforce this, but the media likely will not help create party dominance in the first place.

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